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OHIO'S NEW DRUNK DRIVING
LAW: A HALFHEARTED
EXPERIMENT IN
DETERRENCE
Lewis R. Katz*
Robert D. Sweeney, Jr.*
In response to strong publicpressure, Ohio has adopted a stringent D WI law
which increasedpenalties and streamlinedproceduresso that more offenders would
be subject to harsherpunishment. This Article analyzes the new law and the obstacles to its effective enforcement, such as Ohio's constitutionalguaranteeofmunicipal
home rule. Finall, the Article assesses the likely deterrenteffect ofthe new law, and
offers proposals to enhance the effect andpromote thepurposes of the statute.

INTRODUCTION

THE TRAGIC proportions of the drunk driving problem in the
United States are well-documented. Conservative estimates
blame drivers with blood alcohol concentrations' of .10% or more2
for over 15,000 fatal crashes per year,3 nearly half of the fatal
crashes nationwide. In fact, a recent study by several pathologists
indicates that over ninety percent of those fatal crashes may be
caused by drunk drivers.4 Further, drivers with BAC's of 10% or
more are responsible for one of every ten personal injury crashes
* Lewis R. Katz is the John C. Hutchins Professor of Law and Director of the
Center for Criminal Justice at Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Robert D.
Sweeney, Jr. is a law student ('85) and a member of the Law Review. The research for this
Article was funded by a grant from the Carlton C. Hutchins Testamentary Trust. The
authors note with appreciation the assistance of law student Sean Dorsey ('85) who gathered the statistical data in Cleveland and Cleveland Heights Municipal Courts.
1. Blood alcohol concentration ("BAC") figures represent the percentage of alcohol
in the arrestee's (or the deceased's) blood by weight. In some states, a breath or urine test
rather than a blood test is used to calculate BAC.
2. Most states use the .10 figure to define a per se offense or as creating a presumption of intoxication. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY LAWS:
A NATIONAL OVERVIEW 1981, at 44 (1982) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL OVERVIEW].
3. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY: A REVIEW OF THE
STATE OF KNOWLEDGE, SUMMARY VOLUME 1978, at 8 (1979) [hereinafter cited as SUMMARY VOLUME].

4. Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 9, 1984, at 5-B, col.2.
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and one of every twenty property damage accidents. 5 The estimated cost of accidents caused by drunk driving exceeds six billion dollars yearly. 6 The Ohio Department of Highway Safety
reported that in 1983, 647 of the 1520 fatal crashes in Ohio, or
forty-three percent, were "alcohol-related, ' 7 fifty-eight more than
in 1982.8
The effect of alcohol on driving performance should be evident to anyone who has ever drunk too much and then attempted
to drive. The frequency of drunk driving creates a tendency to
view this criminal behavior without the condemnation warranted
by its often tragic consequences. Until recently, the law's treatment of drunk drivers has been shaped by this tolerant attitude,
and enforced and administered by police, prosecutors and judges
affected by a "there but for the grace of God go I" syndrome.9
The causal relationship between drinking and poor driving is
supported by conclusive scientific proof. Epidemiological studies
comparing physical conditions and characteristics of drivers involved in crashes with the general driving population demonstrate
that as the BAC approaches .08%, the likelihood of involvement in
a crash increases dramatically. A driver with a BAC of .15% is
fifteen to twenty times more likely to be involved in a fatal crash
than a driver who has drunk nothing. Behavioralists, testing the
effect of alcohol on psychomotor control under laboratory conditions and in controlled driving situations, have verified that drink5. SUMMARY VOLUME, supra note 3, at 10-11.
6. Id. at 14.
7. The "alcohol-related death" statistic is somewhat rough, since it includes drunk
pedestrians and bicyclists as well as automobile drivers. Moreover, the determination of
what constitutes an "alcohol-related death" is generally made by the officer at the scene,
and may depend on unscientific factors like the presence of empty beer cans in an automobile involved in a crash. Nonetheless, this statistic gives a sense of the scope of the Ohio
problem.
8.

Weekly "Box Score" Report, OHIo DEP'T OF HIGHWAY SAFETY NEWS (Jan. 6,

1984) [hereinafter cited as Box Score].
9. [G]enerally the community wants to see the law enforced, but when they are
sitting in the jury box and they are hearing a case, they put themselves in the
shoes of the defendant and say, "Well, I have done the same thing. I was just
fortunate in not getting caught."
Oversight into the Administration of State and Local Court Adjudication of Driving While
Intoxicated Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., IstSess. 80 (1981) (testimony of Capt. Wayne Layfield, Alcohol Enforcement Unit, District of Columbia Police Dep't.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
10. See SUMMARY VOLUME, supra note 3, at 15-17. The following chart is provided
by the Ohio Department of Highway Safety:
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ing significantly affects driving performance."'
In the past five years more than half the states have recognized
the seriousness of the problem and amended their driving while
intoxicated' 2 statutes.' 3 These efforts have been prompted by
groups like MADD (Mothers Against Drunk Driving) which have
appealed to the public and pressured legislatures at every level to
adopt more stringent drunk driving laws. Ohio responded to this
pressure in 1982 by adopting Amended Substitute Senate Bill
432,"' which changed Ohio's DWI law effective March 16, 1983.'
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11. See SUMMARY VOLUME, supra note 3, at 17-19.
12. Hereinafter referred to as DWI. States and commentators refer to the offense by
several other names, including Driving Under the Influence (DUI), and Operating a Motor
Vehicle While Intoxicated (OMVI).
13. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 32-5-192, 32-5A-191 (Supp.1983); ARtz. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 28-691, 28-692 (West Supp. 1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-2501 (West Supp.
1983); CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 13352, 13353 (West Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1202
(Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-227a, 14-227b (West Supp. 1983); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 21, §§ 4177(A)-(E) (West Supp. 1982); HAwAII REV. STAT. § 291-94 (Supp.
1982); IDAHO CODE §§ 49-352, 49-1102A, 49-1 102B (1983 Supp.); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95
1/2, § 11-501 (Smith-Hurd 1983); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-2-1, 9-11-2-2, 9-11-2-3,
9-11-3, 9-11- 4 (West Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.281 (West Supp. 1983); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.98 (West Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, §§ 1311-A,
1312-B, 1312-C (West Supp. 1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§257.625, 257.625a,
257.625b (West Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 169.121, 169.123 (West Supp. 1984);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-11-30 (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. ANN. §§ 577.010, 577.012
(Vernon Supp. 1984); N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW § 1192 (McKinney Supp. 1983); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 39-08-01 (Supp. 1983); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (Page Supp.
1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §§ 11-902, 11-904 (West Supp. 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 31-27-2 (Supp. 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2930 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 32-23-1 (Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 1983).
14. Hereinafter S.B. 432.
15. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (Page Supp. 1982). S.B. 432 changed or added a
total of 19 Code sections.
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These amendments concentrate on increased penalties and
streamlined procedures so that more offenders may be subjected
to harsher punishment. Specifically, the law encourages quick removal of drunk drivers from highways, simplifies evidentiary requirements, mandates incarceration for all convicted defendants,
and enhances penalties for recidivists. Its purpose is to shock apprehended offenders into complying with the DWI law, to deter
the general community from engaging in the prohibited conduct
and, ultimately, to encourage compliance by fostering an attitude
that drinking and driving is unacceptable behavior. This article
analyzes the amendments to Ohio's DWI law and the constitutional issues they raise, discusses the purported obstacle to the deterrent value of the amended law posed by the Ohio constitutional
guarantee of municipal home rule, assesses the likely deterrent effect of the new law, and offers proposals to enhance the effect and
promote the purposes of the law.
I.

S.B. 432

A. Nature of the Offense
Ohio's drunk driving law prior to S.B. 432 prohibited the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated or under the influence
of alcohol or drugs.' 6 Chemical tests indicating the blood alcohol
content of the driver's "blood, urine, breath, or other bodily substance" were admissible evidence. If the chemical test showed
that a statutorily specified level of alcohol was present in the arrestee's blood, a rebuttable presumption of intoxication was created. A BAC of .10% or more created the presumption that the
defendant was under the influence of alcohol;' 7 more than .05%
but less than. 10% gave rise to no presumption but was admissible
to be considered with other competent evidence in determining
guilt or innocence;18 .05% or less created the presumption that the
defendant was not under the influence of alcohol. 9 Thus, under
16. Prior to the adoption of S.B. 432, § 4511.19 provided: "No person who is under
the influence of alcohol or any drug of abuse, or the combined influence of alcohol and any
drug of abuse, shall operate any vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley within this state."
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (Page 1982) (current version at OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 4511.19 (Page Supp. 1982)).
17. Id. § 4511.19(B) (repealed 1983).
18. Id. § 4511.19(A) (repealed 1983).
19. Id. § 4511.19(C) (repealed 1983). Section 4511.19 prior to S.B.432 was very similar to UNIFORM VEH. CODE § N-902.1 (Supp. I 1976).
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Ohio law before S.B. 432, the trier of fact had to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was "under the influence" of
alcohol or a drug of abuse. The results of the chemical test could
aid in that finding, as could the personal characteristics of the
driver at the time of arrest: erratic driving, an odor of alcohol,
slurred speech, an inability to walk a straight line or to communicate coherently. Conversely, the defense could rebut the state's
claim of intoxication with evidence of the defendant's sobriety. In
Ohio the "under the influence" standard was subjective, somewhat undefined, and often difficult to prove.2"
Yet the 1983 amendments to the DWI law retain this offense
for situations in which the defendant is charged with driving
under the influence of a drug of abuse, or when the defendant is
charged with operating under the influence of alcohol and refuses
to submit to a chemical test, or when the defendant's chemical test
reading does not surpass the proscribed level.2 The most significant amendment to the DWI statute is the creation of three new
offenses as alternatives to the traditional DWI prosecution. The
new per se offenses prohibit operation of a motor vehicle if a person has:
1) a concentration of ten-hundredths of one percent or
more by weight of alcohol in his blood;
2) a concentration of ten-hundredths of one gram or more
by weight of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of his
breath;
3) A concentration of fourteen-hundredths of one gram or
of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of
more by weight
22
his urine.

The alternate offenses greatly simplify the task of the prosecution.
The trier of fact need not find that the defendant operated a motor
vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs, but only that the
defendant operated a motor vehicle and that the defendant's
chemical test reading was at the proscribed level. The critical issue at trial becomes the accuracy of the test, not the behavior of
the accused.2 3
20. In 1971 the Ohio Supreme Court held that it was not sufficient for the prosecution
to establish that the alcohol consumed by the defendant had some influence on his behavior. Rather, the court required the trier of fact to find that the alcohol had deprived the
defendant of the "clearness of intellect and control which one would otherwise possess."
State v. Hardy, 28 Ohio St. 2d 89, 91-92, 276 N.E.2d 247, 249-50 (1971).
21. OH io REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19(A) (Page Supp. 1982).
22. d. § 4511.19(A)(2)-(4).
23. There is a distinct hierarchy of accuracy for the three tests. Blood tests are the
most accurate, giving a direct reading of blood alcohol concentration, and if properly ad-

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:239

The per se offense may be misunderstood as creating a conclusive presumption of intoxication, thus shifting the burden of proof
from the prosecution, and depriving the defendant of his right to a
jury determination. This misunderstanding arises because under
the statute existing prior to the development of the per se offense,
a specified BAC created a rebuttable presumption of intoxication.
However, the per se offenses do not involve presumptions and,
technically, are not concerned with intoxication. They provide an
alternative offense to driving under the influence of alcohol,
prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle when the proscribed
level of alcohol is found in the blood, breath, or urine.24 The
prosecution need not prove that the defendant was either intoxiministered, are virtually immune to challenge. Breath tests are subject to a wide array of
challenges, and there is extensive literature detailing the scientific reasons for and frequency of the inaccuracy of breath tests. It is generally conceded, for instance, that a margin of error of as much as .03 is possible, and inaccuracy may result depending upon what
the person tested had recently eaten, whether he belched or vomited during or just before
the test, whether he took medication, or a host of other personal characteristics. See Taylor, Blood-Alcohol Analysis andthe FourteenthAmendment, 10 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP.
117-19 (1983). But see State v. Brockway, 2 Ohio App. 3d 227, 441 N.E.2d 602 (1981)
(alcohol breath test results sufficiently reliable to be admitted without expert testimony if
conducted under approved methods), The notorious inaccuracy of urine tests makes their
inclusion in the statute unwise.
For discussions of criminal defense approaches to the Ohio DWI charges, see generally
L. TAYLOR, DRUNK DRIVING DEFENSE 163-201, 265-325 (1981 & Supp. 1983); 3 R. ERWIN, DEFENSE OF DRUNK DRIVING CASES § 33 (3d ed. 1983 & Supp. 1984).
24. A claim that a similar statute created an irrebuttable presumption of intoxication
was rejected in City of Seattle v. Urban, 32 Wash. App. 634, 648 P.2d 922 (1982) (statute
sets out alternative methods of committing the crime of driving under the influence); see
also Coxe v. State, 281 A.2d 606 (Del. 1971) (state still has burden of proving physical
control of vehicle and failure of breath test beyond a reasonable doubt); People v. Ziltz, 98
Ill.2d 38, 455 N.E.2d 70, 72-73 (1983) ("When the State has proved that the defendant was
operating the vehicle and his blood alcohol concentrate was over 0.10%, there are no presumptions or inferences. . . .The state must still persuade the trier of fact that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle and had a [BAC] in excess of 0.10%").
An alternative constitutional challenge to the per se offenses raises the claim that the
statute is vague and does not provide notice of the offense because a defendant, who is not
completely prohibited from some drinking and then driving, has no way of knowing when
his BAC reaches the prohibited level. This claim comes close to being frivolous. There are
ways for an individual to determine his own capacity by consulting one of the many frequently published charts. See, e.g., supra note 10. Moreover, the law intends to encourage
drinkers to act conservatively when they intend to drive, and it is not unfair to place the
burden upon the individual to know when his conduct becomes a potential violation. It is
a matter within the knowledge of any person of common understanding. A trend among
state courts considering comparable statutes has been to reject both the vagueness and lack
of notice claims. See Gifford and Friedman, A ConstitutionalAnalysis of Ohio's New
Drunk DriingLaw, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 133, 136-44 & 169 (1983).
A recent Canton municipal court decision finding the statute unconstitutionally vague
was reversed by the Fifth District Court of Appeals. State v. Jackson, No. 6253 (1983)
(citing with approval City of Columbus v. Adams, No. 83AP-305, slip op. (10th Dist. Ct.
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cated or driving under the influence, for neither element is part of
the offenses described in sections 4511.19(A)(2-4) of the Ohio
Revised Code.25

B. Penalty Changes
S.B. 432's amendments to the penalties for DW12 6 were
designed to communicate the seriousness of the crime to apprehended drivers, to deter other drivers with the threat of certain
and harsh punishment, and to eliminate lenient sentences. The
legislature reenacted the mandatory minimum three-day sentence
for first offenders,2 7 except this amendment requires that the days
App. Aug. 4, 1983)). The defendants in Jackson have given notice of their intention to file
an appeal in the Ohio Supreme Court. But cf.infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
25. In most Ohio jurisdictions, arrestees are charged with violating both
§ 4511.19(A)(1) and one of the per se sections, § 4511.19(A)(2)-(4). Bender, Ohio's New
41cohol Impaired Driving Law-A JudicialPerspective, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 117, 130-32
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Judges'Survey]. Eighty-five percent of the judges responding to
the question, or 105 out of 123, reported that offenders in their courts are usually charged
under both (A)(1) and one of (A)(2)-(4). Id Thus, the prosecutor has great leverage, since
the arrestee may be subject to drunk driving prosecution through two different routes, although only one conviction is possible.
As an aid to enforcement of the per se laws, the new law removes some of the previously existing impediments to administration of blood tests. OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 45 11.19(B) (Page Supp. 1982). It allows blood tests to be administered by "a qualified
technician or chemist." Under the former law, only physicians and registered nurses were
permitted to administer blood tests. The person responsible for drawing blood may use his
own judgment in determining whether the "physical welfare" of the driver would be adversely affected by the test. The arrested driver may have similarly qualified people of his
choice administer tests in addition to those required by the police. Further, the new law
makes a person who withdraws blood immune from criminal prosecution and civil liability, except in cases of malpractice "for any act performed in withdrawing blood from the
person." These revisions are important when an allegedly intoxicated driver is hospitalized. Technicians, rather than physicians or nurses, normally perform blood tests on patients; the former statute's requirement that a doctor or nurse perform the test required an
unnecessary departure from normal hospital procedure. Where an unconscious driver is
given a blood test, the immunity from battery given by the new law prevents the driver
from suing the person who administered the test for an unconsented intentional touching
while the driver was unconscious.
26. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.99(A) (Page Supp. 1982).
27. For three decades, the Ohio General Assembly has been trying to ensure that
DWI offenders spend at least three days in jail. A provision specifying that "no court shall
suspend the first three days of any sentence imposed under this section" was added to
§ 4511.99 by S.B. 32, enacted by the General Assembly and signed into law by Governor
Lausche in 1953. 1953-54 Ohio Laws 461 (current version at OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4511.99(A) (Page Supp. 1982)).
Some repeat offenders (those who for a period of five years have not been convicted of
the state offense, of violation of a municipal ordinance relating to driving under the influence of alcohol or a drug of abuse, nor aggravated vehicular homicide, see OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2903.06 (Page 1982), or vehicular homicide, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2903.07 (Page 1982), in a case in which the defendant was found to be under the influence
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be served consecutively.2" The purpose of this language was to
avoid judicial circumvention of the statute. The legislature sought

to foreclose sentencing practices which, though technically in
compliance with statutory requirements, failed to treat the offense
as seriously as intended by the General Assembly.29 For example,
the amendment sought to prevent substituting attendance at a
treatment program for incarceration, allowing the sentence to be
served on three separate Saturdays, or satisfying the three-day requirement by beginning confinement at 11:45 p.m., Monday night
and ending at 12:01 a.m., Wednesday morning. The state legislature apparently recognized that leniency for drunk drivers often
derives from a failure to perceive a DWI defendant, who is often a
model citizen, as a criminal. Its stringent measures reflect the intent to alter this belief.3" The General Assembly, therefore, felt it

necessary not only to provide mechanisms for harsh punishment,

but also to prevent the exercise of judicial discretion.3"
The recidivism problem was confronted by adding enhanced
minimum penalties for repeat offenders. Second offenders are
subject to incarceration for not less than ten consecutive days, and
defendants who have been convicted of more than one prior offense are subject to incarceration for not less than thirty consecutive days.3 2 However the rule announced by the United States
Supreme Court in Baldasar v. Illinois 33 suggests that the heavier
penalty may not constitutionally be imposed upon all recidivists.
In Baldasar, the Court held that an uncounselled misdeof alcohol or a drug of abuse) are, under the 1983 amendments, treated similarly to first
offenders. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.99(A)(1) (Page Supp. 1982).
28. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.991 (Page Supp. 1983) provides: "As used in section 4511.99 ... three consecutive days means seventy-two consecutive hours."
29. Interview with Ronald Adrine, Cleveland Municipal Court Judge (March 20,
1984); Interview with Nancy Welchans, Clerk of Courts, Cleveland Heights, Ohio (March
20, 1984).
30. See supra note 9.
31. Early Ohio Senate proposals for S.B. 432 required judges to state in writing their
reasons for allowing plea bargaining in DWI cases, indicating the General Assembly's concern for controlling the leniency that had become endemic to DWI sentencing. REPORT OF
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE ON SUB. S.B. 432, OHIO GEN. ASSEMBLY OF 1982, at 7
(Apr. 22, 1982).
32. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.99(A)(2)-(3) (Page Supp. 1982). The increased
penalties are applicable to DWI offenders who, within the previous five years, have been
convicted of an offense under § 4511.19, or under a municipal ordinance prohibiting driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or convicted of aggravated vehicular homicide
or vehicular homicide arising out of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol or drugs. Ohio judges have identified the increased penalties for repeat offenders
as among the best features of S.B. 432. Judges' Survey, supra note 25.
33. 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (per curiam).
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meanor theft conviction 34 could not be used to elevate a subsequent conviction for a similar offense to a felony. Although there

is a difference between a prior conviction establishing the ground
to elevate a second offense from a misdemeanor to a felony, as in
Baldasar,and the Ohio DWI formula, which merely enhances the

penalty for the second misdemeanor, the Supreme Court has chosen actual incarceration as the critical point for the right to counsel.3 1 Until narrowed or reversed, it is fair to assume that
Baldasar precludes imposition of the recidivist penalty when
based upon prior uncounselled DWI convictions. In such cases,
offenders may not be sentenced as recidivists. An exception to
this rule may exist, however, if the record of the earlier conviction
discloses that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived
his right to counsel.36 Only then, under the Baldasar approach,
34. Even though counsel was not offered or provided for the misdemeanor offense,
that conviction was valid under Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), because the defendant
had only received a fine and suspended sentence.
35. Id. at 373 (Stewart, J. concurring). While Justice Marshall did not join Justice
Stewart's concurring opinion, he voiced agreement in his own concurrence. 446 U.S. at 227
(Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun cast the fifth vote for reversal in Baldasarand
clouded its precedential value. His position mandated reversal in that case because the
original conviction was for an offense punishable by more than six months imprisonment.
Justice Blackmun maintained that such offenses automatically create the right to counsel,
but this position had been rejected by the majority in Scott, 440 U.S. at 373. With the
departure of Justice Stewart, it is not at all clear that a majority of the Court would reaffirm
the position in Baldasar. Cf. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980). Lewis, decided
earlier in the same term as Baldasar,let stand a conviction on a federal charge of possession of a firearm by a person who had been convicted of a felony in any state or federal
court, even though the prior state conviction was without counsel and automatically subject
to collateral attack. The Court relied upon the "unambiguous" language of the statute,
which prohibited possession by any person "who has been convicted," as opposed to persons whose convictions were not subject to collateral attack. Id. at 60. On constitutional
grounds, the Court relied on Scott and stated that an uncounselled conviction is not invalid
for all purposes. The federal criminal offense enforced a civil disability and the prior offense, the Court held, did not" 'support guilt or enhance punishment."' Id. at 67 (quoting
Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967)).
36. "[C]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver" of fundamental constitutional rights and. . . we "do not presume acquiescence in the loss
of fundamental rights." A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether there
has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case,
upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the
background, experience and conduct of the accused.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S.
389, 393 (1937); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937)).
Under that standard, the common municipal court practice of having an accused sign a
waiver of the right to counsel at the time he pleads, without inquiry as to his understanding
of such an act, will not qualify as an intelligent waiver. The constitutionally suspect situation will arise when a municipal court does not assign counsel for a first offender, since that
court (like the City of Cleveland's) almost never jails a first offender under its municipal
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may prior uncounselled convictions provide the basis for an enhanced penalty.
Aside from these constitutional issues, the law's incarceration
requirement is somewhat uncertain. The draft of S.B. 432 that
passed the Senate permitted driver's intervention programs as a
substitute for the mandatory three-day sentence for first offenders.3 7 The only condition was that such intervention programs be
certified by the State Director of Health. But those provisions
were rejected in the revised bill drafted by the House of Representatives, which was adopted and became law. However, the section requiring certification of intervention programs was
preserved in the final version of the statute.38 The purpose of that
section was to ensure that alcohol and drug intervention programs
meet certain minimum standards and not be used merely to avoid
the mandatory sentences. By retaining the certification section the
legislature has generated some confusion and provided a basis for
some judges to substitute intervention for imprisonment.3 9 In all
likelihood, the General Assembly intended that participation in
the intervention programs be assigned as a condition of susordinance. If a neighboring community, which prosecutes under the state statute or an
identical municipal ordinance, uses the uncounseled municipal conviction as a first offense
in order to trigger a minimum 10-day jail sentence, a constitutional problem will arise. See
supra note 35.
37. Am. Sub. S.B. 432, 114th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. § 4511.99(A)(1) (Apr. 29,
1982) (as passed by the Senate).
38. OHfo REV. CODE ANN. § 3720.06 (Page Supp. 1982).
39. Another provision of the legislation has added to the confusion and serves as additional justification for judges assigning first offenders to intervention programs rather than
to jail. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191 (Page Supp. 1982). That section creates a
driver's treatment and intervention special account, funded by a $75.00 license reinstatement fee. Nowhere has the legislature clearly indicated that intervention programs are to
be available in addition to incarceration, although the legislature probably intended that
the programs not be used in lieu of incarceration. H.B. 460, which has been passed by the
House and is pending before the Senate, would amend § 4511.99(A) to allow intervention
programs as an alternative to jail for first offenders. If enacted, the amendment would
clarify the anomaly between § 4511.99(A) and § 3720.06. Otherwise the uncertainty will
remain.
Kenneth Cox, Director of the Ohio Department of Highway Safety, estimates that half
of the judges in Ohio are interpreting the law to allow intervention. Cleveland Plain
Dealer, Dec. 13, 1983, at 5-A, col. 1. Almost half of the judges responding to the Judges'
Survey, supra note 25, said they did not sentence first offenders to mandatory jail terms,
and more than three-quarters of the judges who did not sentence first offenders to
mandatory jail terms assigned intervention instead. Of course, the survey included many
judges interpreting municipal ordinances that may be even less clear than the state statute
in requiring jail terms. See, e.g., infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text. Cox's estimate
of the number of judges who have interpreted the state statute to allow intervention is
probably too high.
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pending a sentence of imprisonment except for the first three days.
While mandatory imprisonment was the most significant penalty
revision of S.B. 432, the law also toughened the provisions governing license suspension 4° and modified the point system.4 1
40. Formerly, the statute required either revocation of a DWI offender's license or a
30-day to three-year suspension. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4507.16(A)-(B) (Page 1982) (current version at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4507.16(A)-(B) (Page Supp. 1982)). S.B. 432
changed § 4507.16(B) to require either revocation or a minimum 60-day license suspension,
keeping the three-year maximum "[i]f the offender has not been convicted, within five
years of the offense, of a violation of section 4511.19. . . or of a [related] municipal ordinance .... " Id. § 4507.16 (B)(1) (Page Supp. 1982). As with the mandatory minimum
jail sentences, repeat offenders are treated more harshly. A second offense within 5 years
triggers a minimum 120-day, maximum 5-year suspension, id. § 4507.16(B)(2), and any
subsequent offense within 5 years triggers a minimum 180-day, maximum 10-year suspension. Id. § 4507.16(B)(3). Complete license revocation is also available to the court in all
cases. Id. § 4507.16(C). For some offenders, these longer suspensions will be a significant
burden. Typically, first offenders are given the minimum license suspension. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 75 (testimony of Lt. Col. Johnny G. Lough, Maryland state police).
For others, however, license suspension is a meaningless sanction. Despite the additional
penalties of impoundment of registration and license plates available under OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4507.38(C) (Page Supp. 1982) for driving under suspension (DUS), and the
fines and imprisonment authorized under id. § 4507.99(B), some offenders refuse to respect
the suspension and continue to drive. An extreme example is Spencer Blatnik of Sandusky,
Ohio who has been convicted 17 times of driving under suspension or without an operator's
license. Mr. Blatnik made headlines because, after a history of 13 DWI charges in 6 years,
of which he was convicted on 6 and had 7 reduced, he was sentenced to a year in jail.
Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 27, 1984, at 8-B, Col. 1. His case serves to illustrate that some
offenders will simply ignore a license suspension. A recent California study estimates that
65% of drivers with suspended licenses drive despite the suspension. See R. HAGEN, E.
MCCONNELL & R. WILLIAMS, SUSPENSIONS AND REVOCATION EFFECTS ON THE DUI OF-

FENDER 12 (State of Cal. Dept. of Motor Vehicles No. 75, 1980) [hereinafter cited as LICENSE SUSPENSION STUDY].

41. The changes made by S.B. 432 in § 4507.40 which deal with the points courts must
assign to various offenses (an accumulation of a certain number of points will result in
license deprivation by the state Bureau of Motor Vehicles) are poorly drafted and have
been another source of confusion for courts trying to assess penalties for drunk driving
offenders. Section 4507.40(G)(4) provides that "[v]iolation of division (A) of § 4511.19 of
the Revised Code or of any ordinance prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol or drugs" is a six-point offense. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4507.40(G)(4) (Page Supp. 1982). But § 4507.40(G)(12) provides that "[v]iolation of division (B) of § 4511.19 of the Revised Code or any ordinance prohibiting the operation of a
motor vehicle with a specified blood, breath, or urine alcohol concentration" is a four-point
offense. Section 4511.19(B), however, does not define an offense; it merely outlines evidentiary and testing procedures for the chemical test offenses specified in § 4511.19(A)(2)-(4).
The blame for this error can be laid squarely at the House of Representatives' door. As
reported by the House Judiciary & Criminal Justice Committee on November 16, 1982,
§ 4511.19(A) duplicated the old "driving under the influence of alcohol or any drug of
abuse, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug of abuse" prohibition. Section
4511.19(B) contained the three new per se offenses, § 451 1.19(B)(l)-(3). REPORT OF HOUSE
JUDICIARY & CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMITTEE ON SUB. S.B. 432, OHIO GEN. ASSEMBLY OF
1982, at 73 (Nov. 16, 1982). Thus, the original purpose of § 4507.40(G)(4) was to assign a
six-point penalty to the old "driving under the influence" offense, and the purpose of
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C. Implied Consent
The 1983 revision of the DWI laws changed the implied consent law significantly.4 2 It provides that any person operating a
motor vehicle is deemed to have consented to a chemical test if
arrested for DWI. The consent encompasses a test not only for
alcohol but for drugs as well. 43 The apparent reason for this
change was the legislature's awareness of the increased role of
drugs as a cause of impaired driving. To stress the importance of
the chemical test, the legislature altered the administrative license
suspension provision as well. It lengthened the suspension following refusal to submit to a chemical test to one year.'
In addition, the law allows for police seizure of an arrestee's
driver's license, and a judicial suspension pending outcome of the
criminal prosecution. The arresting officer is required to seize the
license of a driver who refuses to take a chemical test, or of a
driver who has submitted to a chemical test which registered the
presence of alcohol or drugs at the proscribed level. Following
seizure the officer must forward the license to the court having
jurisdiction over the criminal offense.45 Obviously, the immediate
§ 4507.40(G)(12) was to assign a four-point penalty to the new per se offenses. Why the
Committee chose to make this distinction is unclear. Perhaps the drug-related offenses of
§ 4511.19(A) were considered more serious, or the obvious impairment required to prove
an offense under § 4511.19(A) was considered more culpable. The lower point assessment
was possibly meant to act as an inducement to an arrested driver to submit to a chemical
test. In any case, the Committee's system was dismantled by a floor amendment on November 17, 1982 (offered by Rep. Petro), that put all of the offenses under § 4511.19(A)(l)(4). J. Ohio H.R., Nov. 17, 1982, at 2715. Unfortunately, the General Assembly failed to
recognize the effect of this change on § 4507.40.
42. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191 (Page Supp. 1982).
43. Id. § 4511.191(A).
44. Id. § 4511.191 (D). The administrative suspension by the registrar of motor vehicles does not commence until after the administrative hearing or judicial appeal which are
available following notification of the arrestee by the registrar. The grounds for appeal are
specified in § 4511.191(F), and have been enlarged to include "whether the bodily substance taken from the arrested person was analyzed" in a manner approved by the director
of health. Id. § 4511.191(F). There is no reason for inclusion of this ground for appeal
from the suspension, as § 4511.191(D) authorizes an administrative suspension only in
cases where the driver refuses to submit to chemical testing. However, it is possible that the
General Assembly intended § 4511.191(F) to be the appeal provision for the judicial suspension procedure. See infra note 70 and acompanying text.
45. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(E) (Page Supp. 1982). Strictly speaking, the
judicial suspension is not imposed for an implied consent violation. The principle of implied consent is that a driver has agreed to a chemical test upon a police officer's justified
request merely by being licensed and being on the public highways of Ohio. A driver who
agrees to a test but registers an illegal reading may still be subject to a judicial suspension,
even though he has not withdrawn his implied consent to a test which is a condition of
driving.
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seizure and judicial proceedings that follow were intended by the
legislature to hasten the process of removing drunk drivers from
the roads.
Interestingly, when the police officer seizes a license no suspension occurs. The driver merely loses proof of license.4 6 The
legislature cautiously drafted this section to authorize only a deprivation of the tangible license, not a loss of driving privileges.
Pretrial license suspension is mandated at the defendant's initial
court appearance, which must be held within five days of arrest if
the court determines one of the following conditions to be true:
[T]he defendant has previously been convicted under the state
statute or a municipal ordinance relating to operating a motor
vehicle under the influence;
at the time of arrest, the defendant's license was suspended or
revoked;4 7
the conduct which led to the pending DWI charge caused death
or serious physical harm to another person;
the defendant failed to appear at the initial appearance; or
the court or referee decides that the defendant's continued driving will be a threat to public safety.48
If one of these factors is met, the defendant's license is suspended
until disposition of the criminal case or until the court determines
that the police officer did not have probable cause to make the
arrest.
A driver's license, once available or issued under state law, is a
statutory entitlement involving an important private interest. Accordingly, state procedures resulting in the deprivation of that interest must comport with due process protections.4 9 The
administrative and judicial suspensions of a defendant's driver's
license, while a DWI charge is pending, must be tested under the
Mackey v. Montrym5 ° standard. In that case, the United States
Supreme Court addressed the Massachusetts law which requires
46. It is not an offense to operate a motor vehicle without physical possession of one's
driver's license. When a driver has his license on or about his person, it is an offense to fail

to display it when lawfully requested to do so, but the failure to have the license on or
about one's person is only prima facie evidence of not being licensed. OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 4507.35 (Page 1982); see also Op. Att'y Gen. 7575 (1957) ("not guilty of an offense
under this section if [the operator] fails to display his license by reason of the fact that such
license is not on or about his person and accessible for display"); cf. Gifford and Friedman, supra note 24, at 151.

47. OHIfo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(K) (Page Supp. 1982).
48. Id. Time spent under a pretrial suspension is credited towards a suspension imposed following conviction under § 4511.19.
49. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
50. 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
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the registrar of motor vehicles to suspend a driver's license, without a hearing, for ninety days when a police report indicates a
DWI arrest and a refusal to consent to a breath test. The licensee,
upon surrender of the license, is entitled to an immediate hearing
before the registrar where he may challenge, among other things,
the officer's claim that there was probable cause to arrest. 5 '
The Montrym Court applied the three-part balancing test of
Mathews v. Eldridge to measure the sufficiency of the state procedures in deprivation cases:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.52
Analysis of the private interest in Montrym proceeded from the
Court's recognition that a driver's license is a protected "property
interest" to which due process guarantees apply.53 To measure
the impact upon the private interest, the majority examined two
criteria: the length of the suspension period and the timeliness of
postsuspension review.54
The second aspect of the three-part standard requires an assessment of the "risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the private]
interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. 55 This inquiry involves gauging the "relative reliability of the procedures
51. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(l)(f)-(g) (West Supp. 1983). Montrym
brought a class action suit in federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of the
Massachusetts suspension procedure. A three-judge panel declared the statute unconstitutional on its face, as violating fourteenth amendment due process requirements. Montrym
v. Panora, 429 F. Supp. 393 (D. Mass. 1977).
52. 443 U.S. 1, 10 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 325 (1976)).
53. Id. at 10 & n.7.
54. Id. at 11-12; cf Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977) (upholding Illinois implied
consent law because availability of hardship relief mitigates delay in postsuspension review). The Illinois law, which involved a one-year or indefinite suspension, and a delay of
up to 20 days before a postsuspension hearing, was upheld in Love, apparently because
hardship relief was available. 431 U.S. at 113. In Montrym, however, the analogous Massachusetts law afforded no hardship relief. Yet Chief Justice Burger minimized this, declaring that the critical factors are the duration of a potentially wrongful deprivation and the
timeliness of available postsuspension review. Based on these factors, the majority concluded that neither the nature nor the weight of the private interest in Montrym was great.

443 U.S. at 12.
55. 443 U.S. at 10 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 325 (1976)).
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used and the substitute procedures sought."5 6 Applying this standard, the Court stated that the due process clause does not require
procedures "so comprehensive as to preclude any possibility of error."57 Rather, Chief Justice Burger asserted for the majority that
a predeprivation hearing is not an absolute requirement. Despite
the judicial predilection for such review, the Court found that

postdeprivation hearings suffice, requiring only "that the
predeprivation procedures used be designed to provide a reason-

ably reliable basis for concluding that the facts justifying the official action are as a responsible governmental official warrants
them to be." 58 The Court concluded that an evidentiary hearing is

not necessary to guarantee due process. To support this conclusion, the majority reasoned that a predeprivation procedure-an
arrest-requiring a police officer to rely on objective facts, inevitably within his personal knowledge, comported with due process
requirements. 9 Further support for the Massachusetts procedure
was found in the fact that an officer is well-trained and has incentives to report the facts truthfully because of potential civil liability. Thus, the procedure had the requisite reliability to validate
license suspension without a hearing.6 0
The final leg of the Mathews v. Eldridge analysis as applied in
56. 443 U.S. at 13.
57. Id.
58. Id. Justice Stewart, in dissent, differed with the majority's perception of due process in property deprivation cases. For him, the fourteenth amendment's due process requirement mandates a predeprivafion hearing, "a presumptive requirement of notice and a
meaningful opportunity to be heard before the state acts ...." Id. at 20 (emphasis in

original).
59. Id. at 13-14. "Cause arises for license suspension if the driver has been arrested

for driving while under the influence of an intoxicant, probable cause exists for arrest, and
the driver refuses to take a breath-analysis test." Id
60. Id at 13-17. The Chief Justice's equation of an arrest with a pre-suspension hearing appears to be a cavalier treatment of the hearing requirement. It should be noted,
however, that the law permits a police officer to make warrantless arrests, a deprivation of a
liberty interest, without a prior hearing and without an inquiry into the exigency or necesity of the deprivation. Perhaps the analogy to warrantless arrests, especially of a community resident to be charged with a misdemeanor and who has no history of failing to appear
in court, would have helped the majority to put the prehearing license deprivation issue in
perspective.
Critics of Montrym agree with the dissent's claim that the majority spumed the emergency doctrine of Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 537, 542 (1971), which formerly offered the only
justification for a prehearing suspension. The majority's balancing of public interests
against the right to presuspension review has also been questioned. See Casenote, The Demise of the Emergency Doctrine of Procedural Due Process: Mackey v. Montrym, 21 B.C.L.

Rev. 741, 760 (1980) (Montrym might create opportunity for states to assert other nonemergency interests to justify avoiding presuspension hearings); Note, Implied Consent Statutes
and the Requirements of Due Process: Are They Compatible?, 26 Loy. L. REv. 180, 189

254
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Montrym requires balancing the governmental function served by
the summary procedure against the additional burdens which
would be imposed by an alternate procedure, as well as the degree
to which alternative procedures would hinder fulfillment of the
legitimate government purpose.6 The Court found the state's interest in guaranteeing the safety of its highways to be of paramount importance. Thus, the abbreviated deprivation procedure,
which might not satisfy a lesser governmental interest, passed
muster.62 The summary sanction, the majority concluded, served
the governmental purpose well: its very existence deters drunk
driving; it provides strong inducement to take the breath-analysis
test, thereby serving the state's interest in obtaining reliable evidence for use in the subsequent criminal prosecution; and, "in
promptly removing such drivers from the road, the summary
sanction of the statute contributes to the public safety.1 63 Thus,
the Court concluded that the Massachusetts procedure did not violate due process requirements.

Ohio's DWI law allows for two suspension procedures-administrative, by the registrar of motor vehicles, and the

hybrid police-judicial pretrial suspension. To test their constitutionality, both must be measured against the Mathews v. Eldridge
due process standards as applied in Montrym. The administrative
suspension raises no constitutional issue because Ohio's statutory
protections far exceed the comparable procedures in the Massachusetts statute upheld in Montrym. A request for a hearing
under the Ohio statute delays license suspension until the "termination of any hearing or appeal. . . ."I Thus, the Ohio proce(1980) (there are more rational ways of protecting state interests in highway safety than
deprivations of individual due process rights).
61. 443 U.S. at 17-19.
62. Id. at 17. The majority reasoned that this interest in safety distinguished Montrym
from Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). In Bell. the Court held that a state could not
suspend the license and registration of a driver who had been involved in an accident and
failed to post security to cover damages, without first providing an opportunity to determine whether there was a reasonable possiblity of a judgment being rendered against the
driver. Id. at 542. The Court noted that when a state terminates such an interest, "it must
afford 'notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case' before
termination becomes effective." Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)). The majority avoided the Bell rule
in Montrym by finding that preservation of highway saftey was of greater public interest
than assuring the financial resposiblity of drivers involved in accidents as in Bell.
63. Montrym, 443 U.S. at 18. The Court argued that requiring a presuspension hearing would give drivers an incentive not to take the test, and serve as a "dilatory tactic." Id.
64. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.191 (E) (Page Supp. 1982). A favorable decision at
the hearing or on appeal results in the dissolution of the suspension order.
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dure expressly provides the driver with an avenue to avoid
suffering the detriment of a prehearing suspension. The suspension is automatically delayed upon the driver's filing a request for
a hearing. Like the Massachusetts procedure upheld in Montrym,
the Ohio statute allows a suspended driver to challenge, at the
hearing, the police officer's claim that probable cause supported
the arrest and the request that the driver take a chemical test.6 5
The judicial suspension procedure in section 4511.191, however, creates a closer due process question. Each step of the judicial suspension procedure must be evaluated by the due process
criteria of Montrym. First, a driver who is arrested for DWI has
66
his license taken away for failing or refusing a chemical test.
This action by the police officer probably does not create a due
process issue, since an Ohio driver need not have physical possession of his license in order to drive. 67 The arrestee has not, at this
point, been deprived of his driving privilege.
Next, the police officer is required to forward the license to the
court in which the arrestee is scheduled to appear. 68 Within five
days of the arrest, that court must hold a hearing to determine
whether to suspend the arrestee's driving privileges pending the
outcome of the trial on the DWI charge (or the grant of a motion
to dismiss the charge for lack of probable cause).69 Section
4511.191(K) sets out the five criteria which the court must use to
determine whether to suspend the arrestee's license.70 The section
fails, however, to provide for review at the five-day hearing of the
circumstances which resulted in the arrest. The arrestee's license
may be suspended for a lengthy period without the opportunity
65. See id §4511.191(F).
66. Id. § 4511.191(K).
67. Failure to have physical possession of one's license while driving in Ohio is not of
itself an offense. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
68. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(K) (Page Supp. 1982).
69. Id.
70. The five criteria include: whether the defendant has a previous DWI conviction;
whether his license was suspended or revoked when arrested; whether he caused death or
serious physical harm to another, whether he failed to appear at the five-day hearing; or
whether he poses a continuing safety hazard. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(K)(1)-(5)
(Page Supp. 1982). Consequently, the § 4511.191(K) procedure creates an opportunity to
be heard in an impartial forum before a license suspension is imposed. Moreover, the
criteria for license suspension are directly related to the prospective hazard that continued
driving by the defendant would pose, not on the driver's refusal to cooperate with the
police. This procedure would probably satisfy even the Montrym dissenters, who had found
the Massachusetts statute deficient because they felt that no adequate predeprivation hearing was provided and because refusal of the chemical test was the basic criterion for license
suspension. 443 U.S. at 24-26.
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for prompt postdeprivation review of whether there was probable
cause for the arrest, whether the chemical test was properly administered, or whether the arrestee was properly warned of the
consequences of refusing a chemical test. The availability of this
review of the police officer's actions was critical to the holding of
the Montrym Court that the Massachusetts statute satisfied due
process.7 ' Therefore, the Ohio judicial suspension procedure may
fail the due process test of Montrym. Recently, the Supreme
Court of Ohio in City of Columbus v. Adams7 2 ignored the due
process deficiencies of the judicial suspension procedure, holding
that a suspension under § 4511.191(K) is not a final appealable
order.7 3
The argument that the Ohio judicial suspension procedure
fails the due process test of Montrym is based on a narrow reading
of section 4511.191(K). This statute does not expressly exclude
these important arrest and testing issues from review at the fiveday hearing. Moreover, courts may be justified in allowing these74
issues to be raised based on other language in section 4511.191.
S.B. 432 added to the administrative suspension procedure section
4511.191(F), which provides that the analysis of the bodily substance withdrawn from the arrestee may be challenged at the adSince an administrative
ministrative suspension hearing."
suspension is imposed only for refusal of a chemical test, this pro71. Id at 12.
72. 10 Ohio St. 3d _, - N.E.2d - (1984).
73. Id. We submit that the Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation renders the judicial
suspension proceding vulnerable to a due process challenge in federal court.
The court reversed the Tenth Appellate District's determination that the defense must
be allowed to produce evidence at the judicial suspension hearing. The Ohio Supreme
Court majority balanced the value of permitting an appeal from the judicial suspension
proceeding prior to trial on the criminal charges against the societal interest in the speedy
removal of potentially dangerous drivers from the highway as well as the need to conserve
judicial resources. The majority concluded that "[tihe interests advanced by [the City of
Columbus] are of such a nature and importance to society in general that the inconvenience occasioned by the temporary suspension of driving privileges pales by comparison."
Id. at - N.E.2d at
Neither court ruled specifically on the scope of the issues that might be raised at the
judicial suspension hearing, but implicit in the Supreme Court's opinion is complete approval of the narrow interpretation of the § 4511.191(K) procedure. The three dissenting
justices argued that the majority's reasoning "completely ignore[d]" the United States
Supreme Court's analysis of due process requirements for the deprivation of driver's
licenses. Id. at - - N.E.2d at
74. Statutes should be interpreted as constitutional whenever possible. Justice Brandeis voiced the classic statement of this canon of statutory construction in Ashawnder v.
TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
75. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.191(F) (Page Supp. 1982).
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vision makes sense only if the legislature intended that this issue
be raised at a judicial suspension hearing.7 6 Further, section
4511.191 (K) should be read to presuppose the legality of the arrest
and testing procedures before the application of the five license
suspension criteria. To satisfy the due process requirement of
Montrym, then, the judicial suspension hearing must be expanded
to include challenges to the arrest and testing procedures.7 7
II.

HOME RULE IN OHIO AS AN OBSTACLE TO THE DETERRENT

EFFECT OF

S.B. 432

Proving the deterrent effect of a criminal sanction or judicial
rule is difficult under any circumstances.78 When the sanction is
not applied by the courts, no deterrent effect will be found. De-

spite vast media attention and judicial protestations, defendants
convicted of drunk driving in some Ohio communities are not receiving the mandatory jail sentences required by S.B. 432, 79
thereby undermining the law's potential deterrent effect.
76. The availability of these additional issues at the five-day hearing may, unfortunately, delay imposition of the suspension. The presence of the arresting officer may be
required, for instance, and a judge may have to postpone a hearing until he is available.
Thus defense attorneys may challenge the arrest and testing procedures purely as a dilatory
tactic. Yet some delay may be necessary to satisfy due process. In holding that defendants
must be permitted to introduce evidence at the five-day hearing, the Tenth Appellate District has already expanded the scope of that hearing. See City of Columbus v. Adams, No.
83AP-305, slip op. (10th Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 1983).
77. S.B. 432 made several other changes in Ohio statutes, two of which may affect the
deterrent impact of the law. First, the amendment eased the requirement of proof of financial responsibility for first offenders to recover their licenses. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4509.3 1(B) (Page Supp. 1982). The change elimated the de facto license suspension for
impecunious first offenders caused by inability to meet the rather stringent financial responsibility requirement. Second, the penalties for vehicular homicide and aggravated vehicular homicide were toughened, and the burden of disproving intoxication upon failure
of a chemical test after a fatal accident was shifted to the defendant. See id §§ 2903.06,
2903.07. Thus, in vehicular homicide cases involving drunk driving, the task of the prosecution was simplified and the consequences of conviction were made more serious.
78. The failures of deterrence are readily apparent, but proof of success is immeasurable. While deterrent effects can be judged by reductions in the number of persons apprehended and charged with an offense, that result is not necessarily attributable to the
existence of the law or rule but can be caused by any number of extraneous factors, for
instance, changes in enforcement policy. Proving the affirmative deterrent effect of any
rule, then, is an insurmountable task because it requires determining the reasons law-abiding persons have chosen not to violate a particular law. Imposing the burden of proving a
deterrent effect upon those arguing for the law would virtually determine the debate's outcome. This is true whether the debate focuses upon the deterrent effect of strict drunk
driving laws, capital punishment, or the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule as a means
of protecting fourth amendment rights.
79. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.99(A) (Page Supp. 1982); see infra notes 223,
224, 234 and accompanying text.
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Instead of being prosecuted under the new state statute, 80 defendants are permitted to plead guilty or no contest to drunk driving charges fied under municipal ordinances. Often these
ordinances mirror the former state statute, which did not prohibit
suspension of the "mandatory" jail sentence. 8 1 Alternatively, a
defendant may be charged under both the state statute and the
municipal ordinance, permitted to plead guilty or no contest to the

municipal charge, and in return receive the prosecutor's agreement to dismiss the state charge, which carries the mandatory,

nonsuspendable jail sentence.8 2 Such plea bargaining has the
United States Supreme Court's imprimatur, and constitutional
limitations upon the process have been weakened substantially in
83
the last decade.
80. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (Page Supp. 1982).
81. See id §4511.99 (1976).
82. The City of Cleveland, for instance, charges all arrestees under the state DWI
statute, § 4511.19. However, over 90% of those offenders actually convicted plead guilty to
the municipal DWI ordinance, CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE § 433.0 1(a) (1976), or its
lesser included offense, id. § 433.01(b) (1976). Neither municipal ordinance carries a
mandatory sentence. These statistics are based on a study of the Cleveland Municipal
Court docket. For more detailed data, see infra notes 220-23 and accompanying text. A
sampling of the ordinances of other Ohio municipalities reveals the disparity that predominates statewide. See, e.g., AKRON, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE §§ 73.01, 70.99 (1983) (adopting
per se offenses identical to state's for both DWI and actual physical control; imposing identical minimum penalties for DWI, but not actual physical control; no requirement for
mandatory 72 consecutive hour sentence); CHAGRIN FALLS, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE
§§ 333.01, 303.99 (1983) (adopting per se offenses for DWI and actual physical control but
no adoption of mandatory minumum penalties or prohibition of sentence suspension);
CLEVELAND HEIGHTS, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE §§ 333.01, 303.99 (1983) (adopting per se offenses and license suspension identical to state's; without mandatory minimum imprisonment); COLUMBUS, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE §§ 2133.01, 2133.99 (1983) (adopting per se
offenses and mandatory minimum imprisonment; without mandatory license suspension,
72 consecutive hour requirement, or high-risk insurance requirement; DWI a four-point
offense); DAYTON, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE §§ 71.12, 71.1201, 71.99 (1983) (similar to Akron
ordinance); TOLEDO, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE §§ 333.01, 303.99 (1983) (similar to Akron ordinance; imposes mandatory minimum penalties for physical control offenses, includes 72
consecutive hour requirement). Cincinnati, Ohio, has chosen to abolish its municipal DWI
ordinances in favor of prosecuting all DWI offenders under the state statute.
83. It was not until 1971 that lingering doubts about the legitimacy of plea bargaining
were dispelled. "The disposition of charges by agreement between the prosecution and the
accused, sometimes loosely called 'plea bargaining,' is an essential component of the administration ofjustice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged." Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). Since Santobello, the Court has recognized that prosecutors have tremendous freedom in pretrial bargaining, including the ability to threaten unpleasant consequences if the prosecutor's offer is refused, provided the threat involves a
legitimate charge within the discretion of the prosecutor. The visitation of those dire consequences following a defendant's refusal to accept the prosecutor's offer is not a due process violation: "[In the 'give-and-take' of plea bargaining, there is no such element of
punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution's
offer." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978). Under Bordenkircher,there is no
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The municipal ordinances, existing side-by-side with state statutes prohibiting similar conduct, are a result of Ohio's commitment to municipal home rule, embodied in the Ohio Constitution
almost three-quarters of a century ago by article XVIII, section
3.84

This constitutional provision guaranteeing limited self-gov-

ernment power for Ohio municipalities was a consequence of the
General Assembly's inability to meet local needs-the state legis-

lature's treatment of municipal problems had proven chaotic and
inflexible. 85
due process violation if a prosecutor files or pursues a state DWI charge under § 4511.19
after the defendant refuses the prosecutor's offer to plead guilty to a DWI charge under a
municipal ordinance not carrying the mandatory three-day jail sentence.
84. OHIO CONsT. art. XVIII, § 3, provides: "Municipalities shall have authority to
exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits
such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general
laws."
85. Fairlie, The Municipal Crisis in Ohio, I MICH. L. REv. 352, 352-57 (1903); see
Walker, Municpal Government in Ohio Before 1912, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 6-16 (1948).
Prior to 1851, the General Assembly of Ohio had been burdened with the responsibility
of passing acts of incorporation and amendments to these acts for each community. This
procedure was cumbersome for both municipalities and the General Assembly, since General Assembly action was required for all local needs, however petty, that were outside the
scope of each municipal charter. In 1851, a constitutional amendment restricted the General Assembly's power to the passage of general laws, and specifically forbade conferral of
corporate powers. In order to continue to exercise control over municipalities, however,
the General Assembly adopted the subterfuge of classifying Ohio cities by size and passing
purportedly general laws for each classification. By 1900, all the major cities in Ohio had
their own classifications. In three 1902 cases, of which State ex re. Knisely v. Jones, 66
Ohio St. 453, 64 N.E. 424 (1902), was the most forthright, the Ohio Supreme Court finally
rejected these proliferating classifications as "special legislation." Id. at 489, 64 N.E. at
427. The General Assembly responded by dividing all communities into two groups, making a population of 5,000 the dividing line. The laws passed by the General Assembly
under this new Municipal Code satisfied the Supreme Court's interpretation of the 1851
amendment, to be sure, but straitjacketed municipalities by imposing the same laws on
communities with barely 5,000 inhabitants as on those with over 300,000. Dissatisfaction
with this inflexibility throughout the state led to the 1912 constitutional convention.
The delegates to the 1912 convention may have overreacted to the crisis by adopting
this home rule provision, since a great deal of independence was granted to municipalities.
Home rule in Ohio is termed "constitutional," in that no enabling legislation from the
General Assembly is required before a municipality may exercise its home rule powers.
City of Cincinnati v. Hoffman, 31 Ohio St. 2d 163, 206 N.E.2d 577 (1972); Village of W.
Jefferson v. Robinson, I Ohio St. 2d 113, 205 N.E.2d 382 (1965); City of Akron v. Criner,
112 Ohio App. 191, 175 N.E.2d 746 (1960). For a discussion of this point, see 1 C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 3.10 (1975). Furthermore, Ohio municipalities
need not even have a state-approved charter to exercise home rule, which further diminishes state control. Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 135 Ohio St. 43, 19 N.E.2d 159 (1939); see
Village of Perrysburg v. Ridgeway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (1923). Several states
use charter grants as a curb on self-executing home rule power. See 1 C. ANTIEAU, supra,
§ 3.05; Vaubel, Municipal Home Rule in Ohio, 3 OHIO N.U.L. REv. 643, 650-54 (1976).
For a survey of the practices and policy underlying home rule elsewhere in the United
States, see I C. ANTIEAU, supra, § 3. When the breadth of Ohio's constitutional grant of
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Early in the amendment's history, the Ohio Supreme Court
ruled that the language of article XVIII, section 3, not the intent
of the amendment's framers, would be decisive in apportioning
state and local powers. 86 As a result, the municipalities have been
the beneficiaries of greater power than was ever intended by the
framers of the amendment.8 7 Unfortunately, article XVIII, section 3's language authorizing municipalities to "exercise all powers of local self government" and adopt police regulations "not in
conflict with general laws," coupled with the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of the grant of municipal power under this
language, can restrict the legislature's ability to address statewide
problems that also affect local interests.
Two approaches have been developed which allow a municipality to escape the reach of a state statute controlling a particular
activity. The municipality can contend that the statute is not a
general law, 88 or even if the statute is found to be a general law,
the municipality can argue that its ordinance is not in conflict with
the statute. 89 Consequently, the presence of a statute does not necessarily displace municipal authority to legislate on the same subject-municipal ordinances may coexist with state legislation
regulating the same activity. If municipal ordinances were required to parallel state statutes exactly, home rule would be a
meaningless doctrine-the only advantage municipalities prosecuting under their own ordinances would retain would be the revenues from the fines collected. In some circumstances, municipal
independence is warranted so that special local needs may be met.
But where a statewide problem like drunk driving is identified,
home rule should not be permitted to impede a statewide solution.
The principal issue, then, is how uniform treatment of DWI offenders may be effecuated in light of Ohio's tradition of municipal
home rule and the existing variety of municipal ordinances.
Before 1970, discrepancies between ordinances and statutes
home rule power to municipalities is coupled with the expansive interpretation given it by
the Ohio Supreme Court, it is likely that Ohio grants as much municipal autonomy as any
state.
86. Cleveland Tel. Co. v. City of Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 358, 121 N.E. 701 (1918).
87. Cf. Vaubel, supra note 83, at 703-07, 740-51.
88. See, e.g., City of Columbus v. Molt, 36 Ohio St. 2d 94, 304 N.E.2d 245 (1973);
Village of W. Jefferson v. Robinson, 1 Ohio St. 2d 113, 205 N.E.2d 382 (1965); City of
Fremont v. Keating, 96 Ohio St. 468, 118 N.E. 114 (1917); Fitzgerald v. City of Cleveland,
88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913).
89. See, e.g., Toledo v. Best, 172 Ohio St. 371, 176 N.E.2d 520 (1961); Village of
Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923); Greenburg v. City of Cleveland,
98 Ohio St. 282, 120 N.E. 829 (1918).
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theoretically posed less of a problem, since prosecution under a
municipal ordinance did not foreclose a later prosecution for the
same offense under a state statute. However, in 1970 the United
States Supreme Court held in Waller v. Florida90 that a state and a
municipality within it are not dual sovereigns, and therefore prosecution by both for the same offense contravenes the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. 91 Thus, a DWI
offender charged and convicted under a municipal ordinance who
is sentenced to no jail time, or whose sentence is entirely suspended, may not be prosecuted subsequently under the state statute for the same violation. By itself, however, Waller does not
thwart the intent of the state legislature to toughen drunk driving
penalties. 92 The root of the problem is municipal discretion-the
conscious decisions made by municipal prosecutors, acceded to by
municipal courts, to ignore the state policy by refusing to enforce
the stricter state statute.
Despite the limitations posed by the home rule doctine, the
Ohio Supreme Court can avoid them and require that S.B. 432 be
applied uniformly throughout the state. S.B. 432, and particularly
the changes adopted in the penalty section,9 3 should be declared a
general law. Any municipal ordinance that imposes less severe
penalties would then be deemed to conflict with the general law.9 4
The court has also demonstrated a willingness to circumvent the
express language of article XVIII, section 3 by holding that a state
"police, sanitary" or other regulation must be applied uniformly
throughout the state when the matter regulated is of "statewide
95
concern," a doctrine which might well apply to drunk driving.
A.

TraditionalTest

1. GeneralLaws
The term "general laws" as used in article XVIII, section 3 has
eluded positive definition. The leading cases of Fitzgeraldv. City
90. 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
91. Id at 395.
92. Of course, absent Waller, a grand jury could have indicted under the state statute,
thereby expressing its dissatisfaction (but realistically, the county prosecutor's) with a municipality's decision to utilize its own ordinance and thwart the will of the General
Assembly.
93. OlO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.99(A) (Page Supp. 1982).
94. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Betts, 168 Ohio St. 386, 154 N.E.2d 917 (1958).
95. See, e.g., Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. City of Painesville, 15 Ohio St. 2d
125, 239 N.E.2d 75 (1968).
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of Cleveland9 6 and Village of West Jefferson v. Robinson9 7 suggest
that attempts by the General Assembly to short-circuit home rule

authority by expressly prohibiting or limiting municipal power to
legislate or regulate specific activities that are properly local con98
cerns, are not general laws within the constitutional limitation.
The rationale for this restriction on the General Assembly's power
is that to permit such laws would allow the state legislature, rather
than the courts, to define the power distribution between the General Assembly and the municipalities.9 9 As the Ohio Supreme
Court said in City of Fremont v. Keating, "the general assembly of
Ohio cannot deprive a municipality of its constitutional rights.""°
More specifically, the general law standard operates to prevent
the legislature from explicitly forbidding municipal legislation on
certain subjects. Also, it keeps the legislature from banning the
adoption of municipal ordinances solely because they vary from
state laws. City of Columbus v. Molt10 ' presents an example of a
statute found not to be a general law. The statute at issue sought
to preempt the subject of traffic regulation by prohibiting municipalities from enacting or enforcing any rule or regulation differing
in substance or penalty from the state traffic statute regulating the
same conduct.10 2 The court held that the statute could not foreclose municipalities from regulating traffic, reasoning that the statute simply represented an attempt by the state legislative to usurp
96. 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913). The Fitzgerald definition typifies the difficulty courts have had with this phrase:
Concerning the provision in Section 3, Article XVIII (may adopt such local
police, sanitary and other similar regulations as are not in conflict with general
laws), the general laws referred to are obviously such as relate to police, sanitary
and other similar regulations, and which apply uniformly throughout the state.
They involve the concern of the state for the peace, health and safety of all of its
people, wholly separate and distinct from, and without reference to, any of its
political subdivisions-such as regulate the morals of the people, the purity of
their food, the protection of the streams, the safety of buildings and similar
matters.
Id at 359, 103 N.E. at 517-18.
97. 1 Ohio St. 2d 113, 205 N.E.2d 382 (1965).
98. Id at 118, 205 N.E.2d at 386.
99. City of Fremont v. Keating, 96 Ohio St. 468, 118 N.E. 114 (1917).
100. Id. at 470, 118 N.E. at 114.
101. 36 Ohio St. 2d 94, 304 N.E.2d 245 (1973) (per curiam).
102. Id. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.06 (Page 1982) provides:
Sections 4511.01 to 4511.78, 4511.99, and 4513.01 to 4513.37 of the Revised Code
shall be applicable and uniform throughout this state and in political subdivisions
and municipal corporations of this state. No local authority shall enact or enforce
any rule in conflict with such sections, except that this section does not prevent
local authorities from exercising the rights granted them by Chapter 4521 of the
Ohio Revised Code and does not limit the effect or application of the provisions
of that chapter.
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municipal power. °3
Within the definition of Fitzgeraldv. City of Cleveland't and
Village of West Jefferson v. Robinson, 10 5 S.B. 432 appears to meet
the test for general law, suggesting that it may be applied state-

wide. Its provisions do not facially purport to limit local authority
to legislate or enforce laws on drunk driving. Rather, they are
health and police statutes regulating the conduct of all citizens
throughout the state. 106 As such, the legislative power to establish
103. 36 Ohio St. 2d at 95, 304 N.E.2d at 246.
Molt resolved a conflict among Ohio appellate courts between a lower court's decision
in City of Columbus v. Molt, 63 Ohio Op. 2d 248 (1973), and State v. Waite, 27 Ohio App.
2d 187, 273 N.E.2d 343 (1971), which had found § 4511.06 to be a general law superseding
a conflicting municipal ordinance. The Waite court based its holding on "a clear legislative
intent that both the acts constituting violations of law pertaining to the operation of motor
vehicles upon the highways of this state, and the range of penalties for violations, should be
the same under the state law as well as municipal ordinance." Id at 190, 273 N.E.2d at 344.
104. 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913).
105. 1 Ohio St. 2d 113, 205 N.E.2d 382 (1965).
106. The general laws issue has not been uniformly addressed. A statute that might fail
under the doctrine may nevertheless preempt municipal regulation where the subject matter is of statewide concern. See infra notes 136-56 and accompanying text. In spite of the
general laws limitation on state legislative authority, the General Assembly may be welladvised, in some situations, to pass statutes which would appear invalid under the general
laws doctrine. See Clermont Envtl. Reclamation Co. v. Wiederhold, 2 Ohio St. 3d 44, 442
N.E.2d 1278 (1982). In Wiederhold, a state regulatory scheme controlling hazardous industrial waste treatment was upheld. One of the regulations was expressly directed toward
controlling municipal authority:
"No political subdivision of this state shall require any additional zoning or
other approval, consent, permit, certificate, or other condition for the construction
or operation of a hazardous waste facility authorized by a hazardous waste facility installation and operation permit issued pursuant to this chapter, nor shall any
political subdivision adopt or enforce any law, ordinance or regulation that in any
way alters, impairs or limits the authority granted in the permit issued by the
board."
Id at 46, 442 N.E.2d at 1280. (quoting and upholding OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 3734.05(D)(3) (Page Supp. 1982)). A strict application of the general laws test of Molt
would have invalidated this regulation. However, the court applied the statewide concern
doctrine, which circumvents the general laws/conflict test. The statute. expressly controlling municipalities was found to be a useful expression of legislative intent to make these
hazardous waste regulations uniform throughout the state. In light of Molt, this result
seems anomalous, yet it is justifiable on statewide concern grounds. Statewide concern
determinations are best left to the legislature, when possible, since the legislature is the
factfinding body charged with regulating the affairs of all the state's component parts. In
fact, the leading statewide concern case invalidating a municipal ordinance relied on an
express legislative determination that municipal control over the same subject matter ought
to be limited. See Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. City of Painesville, 15 Ohio St. 2d
125, 239 N.E.2d 75 (1968).
A statute like that in Wiederhold may be squared with Molt as well, if the courts choose
to apply the general laws/conflict laws test, though some expansion of the test would be
required. The statute invalidated in Molt attempted to impose all of the state's traffic laws
on municipalities. It is difficult to see any justification for such a law apart from uniformity
for its own sake. In Wiederhold, however, the challenged statute controlled a very limited
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the new drunk driving standards is unassailable.
2.

Conflict

A finding that a statute meets the general law standard is only
the first step in achieving its uniform application throughout the
state. The greater hurdle in finding that a statute displaces ordinances with different standards and penalties is the constitutional
requirement that those ordinances be found to conflict with the

statute. By way of comparison, the Cleveland municipal ordinance prohibiting drunk driving is similar to Sections 4511.19 and

4511.99 as they existed prior to S.B. 432, and thus differs significantly from the new law. The Cleveland ordinance does not define drunk driving in terms of the percentage of alcohol in the
blood.107 It also contains a lesser offense, failure to have actual
physical control, that is not a part of the state statute.10 8 Most
significantly, the Cleveland ordinance does not prohibit suspension of the first three days of a jail sentence, which is the cornerstone of the new state scheme for controlling drunk driving.
The early test for conflict adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court
in Village of Struthers v. Sokol °9 provided great protection for
municipal authority."' The court said: "No real conflict can exist
unless the ordinance declares something to be right which the
state statute declares to be wrong, or vice versa. There can be no
conflict unless one authority grants a permit or license to do an act
area of municipal authority. When read in pani materia with the rest of the regulatory
scheme, it was found to be necessary to satisfy an important state purpose-construction of
"safe and properly operated hazardous waste disposal facilities within the state to receive
the potentially dangerous wastes from Ohio industry [thereby preventing] such wastes from
fouling our water and countryside." 2 Ohio St. 3d at 48, 442 N.E.2d at 1281. Thus, when
the aggrandizement of state power at the expense of municipalities is either the only possible purpose or the dominant purpose of a statute, the general laws limitation of Moll
should be applied. The constitutional commitment to municipal power must be protected
from the legislature. But when the issue addressed by the legislature warrants control of
municipal power in a closely circumscribed area, the courts should permit such control.
Since the rationale for the general laws limitation is protection of municipal power, occasional inroads upon such power to satisfy important state interests should be permissible,
although closely scrutinized, when there is no wholesale threat to municipal autonomy as
in Molt.
107. "No person who is under the influence of alcohol or any drug of abuse, or the
combined influence of alcohol and any drug of abuse, shall operate any vehicle within the
City." CLEVELAND, OHIo, TRAFFIC CODE § 433.01(a) (1976).
108. Id. § 433.01(b).
109. 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923).
110. See also Greenburg v. City of Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 282, 120 N.E. 289 (1918) (no
conflict when municipality prohibits conduct about which General Assembly is silent).
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which is forbidden or prohibited by the other.""' Under this narrow test, an ordinance does not conflict with a statute when (1)
certain specific acts are declared unlawful by the ordinance and
not referred to in the statute, (2) when specific acts prohibited by
the statute are not referred to by the ordinance, or (3) when different penalties are prescribed for the same acts, whether the greater
penalty is imposed by the statute or the ordinance. Sokol has been
characterized as promulgating a "head-on collision" test." 2
While the Cleveland ordinance does not define drunk driving in
terms of blood alcohol content as the state statute does, it does not
legalize driving with those concentrations of alcohol proscribed by
the statute. One who operates a motor vehicle with one of the
illegal concentrations (blood, breath, or urine) may be found
guilty under the different elements of the municipal ordinance.
That an offender's sentence may be suspended under the ordinance but not under the statute is simply irrelevant to the Sokol
test.
Although Sokol is still followed today, more than sixty years
since it was decided, it should not apply to differences between
state and municipal DWI laws. Central to the decision was the
notion that the municipal ordinance did not impede the state's effort and intention to treat a certain offense harshly, since municipal prosecution was not a bar to a later state prosecution for the
same offense." 13 In fact, Sokol thoroughly discussed the constitutionality of multiple prosecutions." 4 There is no reason why a
discrepancy in penalties between an ordinance and a statute
should have been considered a conflict when Sokol was decided.
However, the later development of double jeopardy protection,
and the change in the state/municipality relationship worked by
Waller v. Florida, mandate reevaluation of the Sokol standard,
and a new definition of conflict when considering disparities in the
severity of penalties.
The Ohio Supreme Court has abided by the Sokol doctrine,
but its support has not been unwavering. The court has suggested
that application of the Sokol test is most appropriate in regulating
liquor dealing, the context in which the case was decided. This
implies that different conflict tests may be warranted depending
111.
112.
113.
114.

108 Ohio St. at 268, 140 N.E. at 521.
Vaubel, supra note 83, at 730.
See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
108 Ohio St. at 269-71, 140 N.E. at 521-22.
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on the area of regulation in which a discrepancy arises." 5 In City
of Cleveland v. Betts,11 6 a situation similar though not identical to
the conflict arising from dissimilarities between the state and municipal prohibitions and penalties for drunk driving, the court acknowledged that the head-on collision test formulated in Sokol is
inadequate and "surely. . .is not exclusive.""1 7 Betts involved a
prosecution under a Cleveland ordinance classifying the crime of
carrying a concealed weapon as a misdemeanor. A virtually
identical state statute designated the offense a felony. Acknowledging that the ordinance did not permit what the statute prohibited, thus avoiding conflict under the Sokol test, the court found
that the ordinance "contravenes the expressed policy of the state
with respect to crimes by deliberately changing an act which constitutes a felony under state law into a misdemeanor, and this creates the kind of conflict contemplated by the Constitution."'1 8
The court reasoned that a misdemeanor entails relatively minor
consequences, "whereas the commission of a felony carries with it
penalties of a severe and lasting character."1'1 9
Disparities between municpal ordinances, like Cleveland's,
and the state DWI statute fit squarely within the framework of
Betts. Although the ordinances neither legalize conduct prohibited under the state statute, nor classify as a misdemeanor an offense which the state labels a felony, they run counter to an
express state policy by failing to require imprisonment for all defendants convicted of drunk driving. Such disuniformity renders
the state policy of deterring drunken drivers a nullity. Once the
public perceives that the purported severity of the amended law is
illusory, any deterrence factor will disappear and those lives that
might have been saved by deterring such conduct will be lost.
Still, the conflict in policy doctrine is not unlimited. The Betts
rationale does not apply to all differences in penalties between a
statute and an ordinance. It certainly applies, however, where the
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See Cleveland v. Raffa, 13 Ohio St. 2d 112, 235 N.E.2d 138 (1968).
168 Ohio St. 386, 154 N.E.2d 917 (1958).
Id. at 389, 154 N.E.2d at 919.
Id.
Id. The conflict in policy rationale has been accepted in several subsequent cases.

In Toledo v. Ransom, 84 Ohio L. Abs. 12, 657 (Lucas Cty. Mun. Ct. 1960), the court ap-

plied the Betts reasoning to find conflict between a municipal DWI ordinance effectively
prohibiting suspension of three-day sentence and a state misdemeanor statute. However,
the court discussed conflict in terms of the Sokol test. See Shipman v. Lorain Bd. of
Health, 64 Ohio App. 2d 232, 414 N.E.2d 430 (1979); Hiram v. Conner, 85 Ohio L. Abs.
161, 173 N.E.2d 408 (Ravenna Mun. Ct. 1960).
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penalty differences reach state or federal constitutional proportions when evident on the face of the conflicting laws. As the
court noted in Betts, the consequences of a felony conviction as
opposed to a misdemeanor conviction are quite serious. 12 0 This
principle is equally applicable to the differences between a misdemeanor conviction under ordinances radically different than the
state statute. Indeed, the consequences of a conviction under the
state statute, which mandates a loss of liberty, are far more serious
than the consequences of a conviction under a municipal ordinance when the sentence is suspended, the normal practice in
some municipal courts. 2 '
Moreover, this disparity is of federal constitutional proportions. The United States Supreme Court has held that certain
122
types of penalties warrant special constitutional safeguards.
Where imprisonment is possible, the actual loss of liberty triggers
the federally guaranteed right to counsel. In Argersinger v. Hamlin,t-3 the Court held that an indigent defendant may not be jailed
following conviction unless the assistance of counsel was provided
or knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived by the defendant. 124 By mandating that all convicted drunk drivers receive a
three-day jail sentence, the General Assembly made an important
policy choice that necessarily activates great procedural safeguards. The sharp difference between the state approach and municipal leniency is readily apparent.
Yet not all penalty variations would amount to a conflict in
policy. If a municipality were to require two days of imprisonment instead of the statutorily-required three, for example, there
would be no conflict under Betts. Such a slight difference in penalty would not indicate a clear legislative intent to treat an offense
more seriously, as required by Betts. However, where there are
bright lines drawn around certain penalties, Betts requires that
120. See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2961.01 (Page 1982); Op. Att'y Gen. 3242 (1962)
(under § 2961.01 one who is citizen of Ohio with all rights of citizen is, upon conviction of
felony, incompetent to be elector or juror, or to hold office of honor, trust, or profit).
121. For instance, only about 17% of those offenders convicted in Cleveland Municipal
Court of the Cleveland municipal DWI ordinance, actual physical control, or § 4511.19,
serve any jail time whatsoever. These statistics are based on a study of the Cleveland Municipal Court docket. For more detailed data, see infra text accompanying notes 223-24.
122. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (United States Constitution requires jury trial when pending charge carried sentence of more than six months).
123. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
124. Id. at 37; see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (state court need not provide counsel for indigent defendant charged with offense punishable by imprisionment if
no jail sentence imposed).
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municipalities respect the state legislature's penalty choices within
these bright lines. In addition to this limitation on the conflict
policy of Betts, the statute must, on its face, reflect the legislative

intent to treat an offense harshly. Since Ohio, like most states, has
no formal means of discovering legislative history, it would be difficult for a court to find policy beyond the language of the statute
25
itself.'
The limitations on the conflict in policy doctrine implicit in
Betts were more explicitly set forth three years later in Toledo v.
Best.126 The court seemed to reinstate the limited Sokol test and
reiterated that a mere penalty discrepancy does not of itself

amount to a conflict: "Where municipal ordinances are analogous
to state statutes in all except punishment or are analogous except

as to the omission of one element of an offense, these differences
do not amount to a conflict with the general laws of the state of
Ohio."' 2 7 At least one commentator has interpreted Best to overrule Betts except when the ordinance designates as a misdemeanor
28
an offense classified by the state as a felony. 1
However, this conclusion does not ineluctably flow from Best.
There, the defendant was convicted under a municipal drunk
driving ordinance which mirrored the comparable state statute,
but for the prohibition on sentence suspension in that earlier version of section 4511.99 of the Ohio Revised Code which the mu125. In Ohio, as in most states, the mere fact that municipal penalties may be greater or
less than the statutory penalties for the same offense usually does not mean that there is a
conflict. See Matthews v. Russell, 87 Ohio App. 443, 95 N.E.2d 696 (1949) (greater penalty
does not conflict); In re Calhoun, 87 Ohio App. 193, 94 N.E.2d 208 (1949) (same). But see
State v. Merlini, No. 9-105 (Lake Cty. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 1982) ("[A] Mentor City Ordinance which imposed a more severe penalty for possession of marijuana than that imposed
by state statute [is] unconstitutional . . . . [T]he nature of the penalty was significantly
changed when the local ordinance imposed a jail sentence for possession of less than 100
grams of marijuana when the same offense was treated by state statute as a minor misdemeanor punishable only by a fine.").
See In re Brown, 121 Ohio St. 342, 168 N.E.2d (1929) (lesser penalty does not conflict);
Toledo v. Kohlhofer, 96 Ohio App. 355, 122 N.E.2d 20 (1954) (same); Lorain v. Petralia, 8
Ohio L. Abs. 159 (Lorain Mun. Ct. 1929).
The general rule elsewhere in the United States is that penalty discrepancies do not of
themselves constitute conflict. See 0. REYNOLDS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, 18 & n. 13
(1982). Texas is an exception to the general rule-conformity with state law is required
with regard to definition and penalty. Young v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 67, 267 S.W.2d 407
(1954).
126. 172 Ohio St. 371, 176 N.E.2d 520 (1961).
127. Id. at 374-75, 176 N.E.2d at 522.
128. Vaubel, supra note 83, at 703-07.
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nicipal ordinance omitted. 2 9 The court refused to find the
conflict in policy necessary to invalidate the ordinance under
Betts, by citing to other statutes.130 The court looked to legislation which authorized sentence suspension for all offenses, and
thus declared the state policy to be unclear: "This is inconsistency
carried to the point of ridiculousness."' 13 1 Importantly, the Best
court recognized Betts as an addition to the head-on collision test
of Sokol. The Best reference to other state statutes-"certainstatutory enactments which we feel are controlling'' 132 -and state pol-

icy which is critical to the decision would have been utterly
gratuitous if the simple Sokol test had been applied alone.
The inconsistency in state policy regarding suspension of
drunk driving sentences referred to by the Best court no longer
129. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.99(B) (Anderson Cum. Supp. 1961) (current version at OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.99(A) (Page Supp. 1982)) provided:
"Whoever violates § 4511.19 of the Revised Code shall be ... imprisoned...
not less than three days nor more than six months and no court shall suspend the
first three days of any sentence provided for under this section."
130. See id §§ 2947.10, 2947.13 (Page) (repealed 1974).
131. 172 Ohio St. at 374, 176 N.E.2d at 522.
132. Id. (emphasis added). Best may suggest as many as three cumulative tests for later
conflict cases. The first, chronologically and logically, is the Sokol/Greenburg head-on
collision test. The second is the Betts conflict in policy test. The third test, if it can be
called such, is rather cryptically articulated near the end of the Best opinion:
[T]he final clinching argument is the result reached in the Municipal Court.
The sentence imposed by the Municipal Court was imprisonment for three days,
assessment of the costs of $81 and suspension of driving rights. Had the defendant
been charged under the state statute in its present form, he could have received
the identical sentence imp6sed by the Municipal Court under the municipal
ordinance.
Id. at 375, 176 N.E.2d at 522. However this passage is interpreted, it makes little sense.
One commentator uses it to support his view that only municipal penalties less than the
state minimum conflict with the statute, which he believes was the intent of the drafters of
the home rule amendment. Vaubel, supra note 83, at 735.
Two objections to this view may be raised. First, conflicts in policy should be possible
when the municipal penalty is more severe. See State v. Merlini, No. 9-105 (Lake Cty. Ct.
App. Nov. 26, 1982). Second, the Best test makes the penalty actually assigned, rather than
the penalty authorized, the basis for a finding of conflict. Using this test, a suspended
sentence under the Toledo ordinance would have been unconstitutional even though a
three-day sentence was not. It seems somewhat capricious to make constitutionality depend on the exercise of ostensibly permissible judicial discretion. However, this position
has some support in other states. See Billingham v. Schampera, 57 Wash. 2d 106, 356 P.2d
292 (1960) (city could not impose penalty in excess of those provided by state statute, but
since penalties actually imposed were within permissible limits, conviction affirmed).
If read literally, this passage from Best cannot be squared with Betts. In Betts, the
sentence actually imposed under the ordinance could have been granted under the statute,
but the constitutional defect was the unavailability of the harsh statutory penalties. The
sentence actually imposed ought to be irrelevant to the "conflict" test. Perhaps the courts
are merely reluctant to overturn convictions on "conflict" grounds when the effect on the
defendant would be the same under either municipal or state law.
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exists. Ohio criminal procedure statutes permitting the suspension
of sentences no longer apply to all offenses.' 33 Moreover, the General Assembly specifically addressed the issue in S.B. 432, providing that a court's general authority to suspend a sentence does not
extend to defendants convicted of drunk driving. The clarified
difference between the statute and the ordinance, therefore, is not
merely a penalty discrepancy. The statutory penalty is evidence
of a firm state commitment to treat drunk driving harshly by mandating imprisonment for all convicted offenders. With that decision, the legislature also activated the relevant constitutional
doctrines. 134 No municipal need, such as the lack of jail space,
may deter the clear goal of the state. As the Betts court recognized, even though "as a practical matter" varieties of municipal

treatment may be desirable, "we cannot ignore those provisions
of
135
organic and statutory law which preclude such a result."'
B.

Statewide Concern

Statewide application of the new DWI law is possible under

the traditional conflict with general laws analysis. Ohio courts
have also circumvented home rule by applying a different standard to the division of power between state and municipal government- statewide concern. That doctrine, which has developed
vigorously in recent years, made its way into the Ohio debate over
the proper relationship between the state and its municipalities
over fifty years ago.
The issue raised in City of Bucyrus v. State Department of
133. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.51, 2951.02 (Page 1982).
134. Even if the state policy regarding sentence suspension had been clear in 1961,
when Best was decided, the Best court might have been justified in not finding a policy
conflict. The constitutional significance of imprisonment versus a fine or a license suspension had not yet been addressed by the United States Supreme Court in 1961.Argersinger,
which illuminated this distinction, was not decided until 1972. See supra notes 12 1-22 and
accompanying text. Today, however, cases like Toledo v. Ransom, 84 Ohio L. Abs. 12, 169
N.E.2d 657 (Lucas Cty. Mun. Ct. 1960), indicate the approach that the Ohio courts should
take.
It is possible that S.B. 432 contains an inconsistency which could make determination
of state policy unclear. Despite the mandatory imprisonment language of§ 4511.99(A)(1)
for first offenders under § 4511.19, some judges have interpreted § 3720.06 to allow driver
intervention programs to replace the mandatory jail time required under §§ 4511.99(A)(1).
See infra notes 247-48 and accompanying text. However, this inconsistency is somewhat
tenuous and can be explained as an oversight in the House of Representatives revision of
S.B. 432. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. A principled reading of§ 4511.99
allows for no ambiguity in determining the state policy to be mandatory imprisonment of
first offenders under § 4511.19.
135. 168 Ohio St. at 390, 154, N.E.2d at 919.
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Health 136 was whether the state could compel a municipality, following adoption of the home rule amendment, to provide a sewage treatment facility that had the approval of the state health
department. Prior to the amendment, the Ohio Supreme Court
ruled, in State Board of Health v. City of Greenville, for the
state.' 37 Likewise, in City of Bucyrus, the Supreme Court gave
short shrift to the city's claim that the amendment deprived the
state of the authority to require that municipalities meet state
standards.
First, the court indicated that the relationship between the
state and its municipalities had not changed substantially as a result of the home rule amendment on matters governing local police, sanitary, and other similar regulations:
The constitutional provision conferring the power with the limitation that the municipal regulation must not be in conflict
with general laws, operates to bestow upon the Legislature the
same power to control sanitation by general laws that it had
prior to the adoption of that article. The power conferred by
that article is conditioned upon the Legislature not having enacted general laws with which
the local sanitary regulations of
138
the municipality conflict.
Second, the court established that the subject matter was of concern to the whole state, even if the treatment facility erected by the
municipality affected only the residents of the municipality.' 3 9
Having found a matter of statewide concern, and without determining whether there was an actual conflict, the court assumed
that any difference created a conflict. The court held that once the
state has acted on an issue which is within its police power, such
as preservation of the public health, the authority of municipalities to act on that subject is inherently limited to supplemental
local regulations which comport with the state legislation. Thus,
the Ohio Supreme Court displaced home rule authority, except for
limited additional regulation, without resorting to the traditional
conflict test. It did so by assuming that a conflict exists whenever
a municipal ordinance in any way impedes execution of the state's

mandate. 140
The most important expansion of statewide concern came
forty years later in Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. City of
136.
137.
138.
139.

120 Ohio St. 426, 166 N.E. 370 (1929).
86 Ohio St. 1, 98 N.E. 1019 (1912).
120 Ohio St. at 428, 166 N.E. at 370.
Id. at 428, 166 N.E. at 371.

140. Id. at 429, 166 N.E. at 371.
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Painesville, when the court considered the home rule authority of
a municipality to regulate the placement of high voltage electrical
transmission lines. 141 This decision established a rational division
of powers and sensible limitations upon local authority when municipal regulation affects statewide interests. The court said that
power granted under article XVIII, section 3 of the state constitution relates to local matters "and even in the regulation of such
local matters a municipality may not infringe on matters of general and statewide interest."' 142 Further, if the impact of a local
regulation is not confined to the particular municipality and "affects the general public of the state as a whole more than it does
the local inhabitants the matter passes from what was a matter for
43
local government to a matter of general state interest."'1
The court recognized the changing patterns of life in the state
and acknowledged that subjects which once might have been considered to be purely local interests could become matters of state14
wide concern, "creating the necessity for statewide control."
Other states with similar constitutional structures have employed
this doctrine extensively.145 The doctrine of statewide concern reflects a recognition that some subjects are far too complex to be
handled through the traditional piecemeal approach of local
regulation.
Instead, the courts have sustained the General Assembly's vision of the need for statewide regulation by focusing on statewide
concern as the suitable vehicle for achieving such uniformity. Application of the doctrine has resulted in foreclosing municipal reg46
ulation of state-licensed hazardous waste disposal facilities.'
Moreover, application has not been confined only to such global
issues as hazardous waste disposal. A municipality's attempt to
exempt itself from paying its employees in accordance with the
141. 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 239 N.E.2d 75 (1968).
142. Id. at 129, 239 N.E.2d at 78.
143. Id., see also Clermont Envtl. Reclamation Co. v. Wiederhold, 2 Ohio St. 3d 44,
442 N.E.2d 1278 (1982); State ex rel. Evans v. Moore, 69 Ohio St. 2d 88, 431 N.E.2d 311
(1982); City of Canton v. Whitman, 44 Ohio St. 2d 62, 337 N.E.2d 706 (1975); State ex rel.
McElroy v. Akron, 173 Ohio St. 189, 181 N.E.2d 26 (1962); Beachwood v. Board of Elections, 167 Ohio St. 369, 148 N.E.2d 921 (1958); City of Rocky River v. Cleveland Elec.
Illuminating Co., 40 Ohio Misc. 17 (1973).
144. 15 Ohio St. 2d at 129, 239 N.E.2d at 78 (quoting State ex rel. McElroy v. Akron,
173 Ohio St. 189, 192, 181 N.E.2d 26, 28 (1962)).
145. See 1 C. ANTIEAU, supra note 83, at §§ 3.20-3.21 (overview of the statewide concern doctrine as used in other states).
146. Clermont Envtl. Reclamation Co. v. Wiederhold, 2 Ohio St. 3d 44, 442 N.E.2d
1278 (1982).
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state's prevailing wage law was held to have significant extraterritorial effects and to infringe on a statewide concern, the integrity
of the collective bargaining system. 47 Similarly, the court has
held that state law predominates when the general health of citizens is at stake, as in the prevention of dental caries. One court
has declared, rather broadly: "The city may exercise the police
powers within its borders, but the general laws of the state are
supreme in the exercise of the police power, regardless of whether
might also properly be the subject of muthe matter is one which
' 148
nicipal regulation."
Certainly, the implications for the health and safety of all
Ohio's citizens raised by the drunk driving problem are as serious
as the prevention of dental caries, warranting utilization of the
statewide concern doctrine to achieve the same result. There were
601 alcohol-related crash deaths in Ohio in 1981, and the high
incidence of impaired driving threatens the safety of every driver
and pedestrian. 149 A recent study claims that ninety percent of all
fatal crashes are the fault of drunk drivers. 150 In the more populous areas of the state, an impaired driver who is on the road for
only a few minutes may cross the boundaries of several communities, all with different and possibly quite lenient drunk driving
laws. Drunk driving is like a contagious disease which does not
respect municipal borders, and when not stringently controlled in
every community, spills over and threatens the health of the entire
state. Some municipalities have proven unwilling to respect the
state policy expressed in S.B. 432. However, the legislative determination that drunk driving requires harsh, uniform penalties
warrants application of the statewide concern doctrine. Despite
the fact that the statewide concern doctrine has never been applied to a traffic regulation, there is no reason why its application
is any less appropriate for drunk driving than for the other issues
to which it has been applied. Only recently have the scope, nature,
51
and seriousness of the drunk driving problem become evident.1
147. State ex rel. Evans v. Moore, 69 Ohio St. 2d 88, 431 N.E.2d 311 (1982).
148. City of Canton v. Whitman, 44 Ohio St. 2d 62, 66, 337 N.E.2d 766, 770 (1975).
149. See Box Score, supra note 8.
150. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
151. The plethora of state per se offenses and mandatory jail terms enacted in recent
years evinces a changing response to the drunk driving problem. See supra note 13. Federal approaches to the problem lend support to the principles behind S.B. 432. See Alcohol
Traffic Safety and National Driver Register Act, Pub. L. No. 97-364, Title I, § 101(a), 96
Stat. 1738 (1982); H. R. REP.No. 867, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-12 (1982). Manifestly, com-
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Thus, legislative solutions tailored to a deeper understanding of
the problem merit assistance from the courts.
Criticism of statewide concern has focused on its lack of constitutional grounding. The Ohio constitution, it is argued, sets up
three areas of power: expressly created, exclusive state power; expressly created, exclusive municipal power; and shared police
power, where friction is resolved by the article XVIII, section 3
test as interpreted by the courts. This criticism claims that if statewide concern means anything more than the constitutionally defined area of exclusive state power, then it is a fourth power source
which bypasses the constitutional limitation on municipal authority-the conflict with general laws test-and is of questionable
52
validity. 1
Consequently, without a constitutional grounding, critics have
argued that there cannot be a principled limitation on state legislative power and see this doctrine as a "threat to municipal autonomy.' 53 However, this criticism envisions a chamber of horrors
resulting in the extraconstitutional elimination of home rule
which the Ohio courts' careful and limited application of the
statewide concern doctrine has avoided. The experience of other
states indicates that ratification of occasional exercises of state
power over subjects traditionally deemed to be within the local
sphere of authority do not greatly threaten municipalities which,
as in Ohio, can exercise all police powers not denied to them. 54
Moreover, Ohio courts have rejected unwarranted applications of
the doctrine, such as an attempt to thwart the right of municipalities to appoint police officers free from state interference. 55
A greater impediment to uniform imposition of S.B. 432
throughout the state is the absence of any expression of legislative
intent that the new law should displace less severe municipal ordinances. In many statewide concern cases, 156 the courts have relied
prehensive state and national programs have emerged as the best solutions to the drunk
driving problem.
152. Vaubel, supra note 83, at 1108.
153. Id. at 736 & 810-13.
154. The basic achievement of the 1912 constitutional convention was this creation of
independent municipal power that did not have to flow through the General Assembly.
See supra note 83.
155. State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, 168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958); see also
Dies Elec. Co. v. Akron, 62 Ohio St. 2d 322, 325, 405 N.E.2d 1026, 1029 (1980)
("[R]etainage of funds to guarantee work executed on a contract for the improvement of
municipal property is a matter embraced within the field of local self-government.") (citations omitted).
156. See supra note 104.
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on specific statutes to justify imposing the regulatory scheme in
question on municipalities, statutes which purport to limit municipal power expressly. In this instance, however, a judicial determination that S.B. 432 can be effective only through uniform
statewide application would be adequate grounds for a finding of
statewide concern, and would be consistent with the General Assembly's action and intent.
III.

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PUNISHMENT UNDER THE

DWI

STATUTE

Deterrence of drunk driving is the primary objective of S.B.
432. At least three specific justifications for the new laws fall
under this broad heading. 57 The first, general deterrence, operates to prevent the unapprehended citizen from committing the
proscribed acts by creating an impression that the pain of punishment will outweigh the benefit of breaking the law. Second, special deterrence operates to prevent the apprehended offender from
repeating the act by exposing him to harsh consequences. A third
justification might be termed "formation of a moral component,"' 58 or "formation of a habit of obedience."' 59 The principle
behind habit formation is that if a law is properly enforced over a
period of time, citizens come to obey the law not on the basis of a
rational pain/pleasure calculation, but simply because it has become the "right" thing and there is no thought of acting otherwise.
Of the other justifications for punishment that are advanced to
support particular criminal laws, rehabilitation, retribution, and
restraint, S.B. 432 largely ignores rehabilitation by mandating
minimum terms of imprisonment regardless of the needs
or
problems of the individual offender. There is no comparable requirement of treatment. To some degree, the harshness of the
157. These preventive effects of punishment are discussed in J. ANDENAES, PUNISH8-9 (1974).
There is extensive literature available on the efficacy and morality of deterrence. Those
who find deterrence to be a poor justification for punishment argue that the deterrence
model rests on an overly rationalistic and utilitarian view of human behavior--that it is no
more than retribution in sheep's clothing; that it is empirically indefensible, since there is
no way to prove why the vast majority of people do not commit particular crimes-or they
may cite specific examples, like Prohibition, to show that goodness cannot be legislated into
men. See id. at 65; F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINGS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN
CRIME CONTROL 18-23 (1973). Yet deterrence appears to be as valid an objective as any in
the criminal law, even if our belief in its efficacy is based only on psychological or quasiscientific grounds.
158. See J. ANDENAES, supra note 157, at 8-9.
159. Id.
MENT AND DETERRENCE
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laws satisfies the retribution rationale. Citizens groups like
MADD are understandably outraged at the senseless carnage
caused by drunk drivers. Incarceration of offenders satisfies the
restraint rationale. Yet retribution and restraint are essentially
post hoc reactions to crime. Deterrence is the key preventive
rationale.
The particular activity which S.B. 432 seeks to deter is excessive alcohol consumption and operation of a motor vehicle. S.B.
432 seeks to promote greater security on the highways by reducing
the combination of the two activities; it does not seek to reduce the
amount of drinking done in the state. The General Assembly
opted to impose all of the legal consequences upon the individual
wrongdoer whose behavior creates the threat to safety on the
highways. Eschewed were more dramatic remedies, such as reducing the number of hours that alcoholic beverages may be dispensed in public spots and clubs, which would have interfered
with commerce and encountered opposition from powerful economic interests. The citizens of Ohio recently rejected a potentially helpful remedy by voting to keep the state drinking age at
0
nineteen rather than raising it to twenty-one. 16
A.

General Deterrence-TheEffect of S.B. 432 on the Entire
Community.

General deterrence as a justification for punishment rests on
the psychological theory that in some situations individuals rationally evaluate the legal consequences of their acts before choosing between permitted and proscribed conduct.16 1 General
deterrence operates on the principle that when the certainty, severity, and speed of punishment for certain proscribed conduct outweigh the benefit of this conduct, the actor will choose to obey the
law. 162 The process involves a balancing of risk and benefit. For
a law actually to deter, the individual must be able to perceive
clearly that the risks outweigh the benefits of the illegal activity.
Thus, a fourth element, that of publicity, or awareness, must be
part of any calculation of deterrent effect.
Drunk driving laws have been extensively studied for their
160. Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 9, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
161. See supra note 157; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 19 (D.
Nagin, J. Cohen & A. Blumstein eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL].
162. H. Ross, DETERRING THE DRINKING DRIVER 9 (1981).
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general deterrent effect, both in the interest of curbing fatal
crashes and as a laboratory for testing the psychological theory of
deterrence. 163 Data is readily available through various highway
safety programs. 64 There is wide variety in the laws, enforcement
policies, and publicity attendant upon the enactment of these
laws. 16 It has also been suggested that DWI is mala prohibitum:
"less anchored in morality and other legal systems of rules" than
other offenses.' 66 The general deterrent effect of punishment for
some crimes, like murder, is impossible to evaluate because of the
great many different motivations for the illegal conduct. 167 Drunk
driving offenders are arguably free of this variety of complex
motivations:
The decision whether or not to drink is usually made deliberately, as a rational choice; and the motivation to commit the
offense is not strong. The law interferes only slightly with personal liberty. It asks the citizen neither to stop drinking nor to
stop driving. It merely prohibits combining the two activities.
Thus the drunk driving situation is one in which common sense
tells us that the risk of punishment can be expected68 to have
more effect than in the case of many other offenses.'
This characterization of drunk driving may be somewhat inaccurate because many drunk drivers are alcoholics and problem
drinkers who may not make a rational choice to take even their
first drink of each day. 6 9 Nonetheless, the law does not dictate
that alcoholics not drink, something which without significant
help they may not be able to do. The law's demand is far simpler,
requiring only that the drinker refrain from driving once he commences drinking. These studies provide a yardstick by which to
evaluate the likely deterrent effect of S.B. 432. To the degree that
the provisions of the new Ohio law match statutes in the United
States and other western nations, the likelihood of success of the
new Ohio law can be predicted.
163. Id. at 12-13 & 100-02.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 10. However, the tragic consequences which these laws seek to prevent may
dictate that the conduct involved be labelled at least partly malum in se.
167. "The holdup man who kills simply for gain, the sex murderer whose crime assuages the darkest drives of his sick mind, the uxoricide who seeks desperate relief for a
mental torment that is more than he can bear-there is a world of difference between these
types; all they have in common is the judicial name for the act." J. ANDENAES, supra note
157, at 20-21.
168. Id. at 104.
169. The differences between social drinkers, problem drinkers, and alcoholics are dis-

cussed in SUMMARY

VOLUME,

supra note 3, at 21.
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1. Foreign Experiences with Drunk Driving Laws
a. The Scandinavian Experience. Chemical testing of blood
alcohol content became possible in the 1920's.' 7 ° In 1936, Norway
changed its DWI law, making it an offense to drive with a specified BAC. Sweden followed Norway's lead in 1941. In addition
to evaluating drunk driving by measuring blood alcohol content,
the new laws prescribed harsher penalties upon conviction, including the virtual certainty of imprisonment. The effect of the
definitional change in the offense was threefold: (1) it gave scientific validity to the previously vague concept of intoxication embodied in traditional statutes; (2) it eased the mode of proof
required, making it dependent on a simple chemical test rather
than a description of behavior; and (3) it provided for faster disposition of cases without difficult trials.171
These Scandinavian reforms did not result from a belief that
the traditional DWI statutes were failing to control drunk driving.
The reforms were sparked by the political ascendancy of a temperance movement and its influence on the parliaments of Norway and Sweden.' 72 Regardless of the impetus for their
enactment, the Scandinavian laws have been studied extensively
as experiments in deterrence.' 73 Nonetheless, almost fifty years
later, whether these original Scandinavian laws had or continue to
have a deterrent effect on the combination of drinking and driving
remains the subject of vigorous sociological dispute. The competing positions in the dispute make it virtually impossible to conclude that the laws have had a deterrent effect, but they do prove
the importance of methodology in reaching a conclusion. They
also demonstratate the difficulties involved in proving the deterrent effect of any law.174 The researchers agree, however, that
170. Id. at 6. Indiana was the first state to statutorily allow admission of chemical test
results as evidence, in 1939. Id. at 37.
171. See H. Ross, supra note 162, at 21-29.
172. Id. at 22.

173. "These characteristics of the law [discussed in text accompanying note 159] are in
accord with practical suggestions for behavior control derived from the theoretical model
of deterrence." Id. at 24.
174. H.L. Ross, perhaps the leading author in the field of deterrence of drinking drivers
(and generally the most skeptical of any alleged deterrent effect), has concluded that it is
impossible to prove whether the Scandinavian laws had or continue to have any general
deterrent effect, and suggests alternate explanations for the evidence commonly offered in
support of this belief. Id. at 60-69; see also Ross, The Scandinavian Myth.: The Effectiveness ofDrinking-and-DrivingLegislation in Sweden andNorway, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 285, 295

(1975) (more detailed statistical study of Scandinavian laws based on interrupted time series analysis) [hereinafter cited as Ross, The Scandinavian Myth]. But see J. ANDENAES,
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most Scandinavians refrain from drinking and driving. They differ on the role played by the law in the development of that pattern of national conduct. This disagreement could not be sharper:
one researcher characterizes the claim that the laws deter drunk
driving as the "Scandinavian myth,"' 75 simultaneously acknowledging that the causal changes may have been too small and the
effect measures too inaccurate to yield any evidence one way or
the other,17 6 while a second researcher claims that "the legislation
has been instrumental in forming. . . the widespread conviction
to place oneself behind the wheel
that it is wrong, or irresponsible,
177
'

when intoxicated."

b. Great Britain: An Effective Deterrent. All commentators
found at least a temporary deterrent effect on drinking and driving following the enactment of the British Road Safety Act of
1967. 17T The Act made driving with a blood alcohol content in
excess of .08% a per se offense, stricter than the Ohio standard.
The law did not impose stricter penalties for drunk driving;
stricter penalties had been enacted five years earlier, without appreciable deterrent effect. 179 Penalties remained limited to fines
and license suspension.18 0 Instead, the new law focused upon enforcement, authorizing police to demand that a driver submit to a
chemical test when involved in an accident, when stopped for a
moving violation, or when police have reasonable cause to believe
that he is intoxicated.' 8' On paper, at least, the legislation insupra note 157, at 60-61 & 82 n.39; Andenaes, The Effects ofScandinavia's Drinking-andDriving Laws: FACTS AND HYPOTHESE, in 6 SCANDINAVIAN STUDS. IN CRIMINOLOGY 35

(1978); Votey, The Deterrence aDrunken Driving in Norway and Sweden: An Econometric
Analysis afExistingPolicies, in 6 SCANDINAVIAN STUDS. IN CRIMINOLOGY 79 (1978). Both
Andenaes and Votey are convinced that the Scandinavian laws deter drunk driving.
175. Ross, The Scandinavian Myth, supra note 174, at 285.
176. See H. Ross, supra note 162 at 62-63.
177. J. ANDENAES, supra note 157, at 60. At bottom, those views of the Scandinavian
laws are not incompatible; Ross and Andenaes differ over the quality of the proof offered
to explain why those laws have worked. "I am persuaded by Andenaes ... that a plausible case can be made for the long-run effectiveness of the Scandinavian laws in Scandinavia, although the case is complex and far from proven." H. Ross, supra note 162, at 69.
Ideally, the Ohio law will have both an immediate general deterrent effect and a long term
effect of formation of a habit of obedience.
178. See, e.g., Sabey and Codling,.41coholand RoadAccidents in Great Britain, in ALCOHOL, DRUGS AND TRAFFIC SAFETY 73, 74-75 (S. Israelstam & S. Lambert eds. 1975);
Ross, Law, Science, andAccidents: The British Road SafetyAct of1967, 2 J. LEGAL STUD.
1(1973).
179. Ross, supra note 162, at 25-27.
180. Id. at 25 & 27.
181. Id. at 26.
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creased the certainty and speed of punishment. Moreover, its enactment was attended by widespread publicity provided by
opponents who feared the enforcement provisions encroached
by a well-financed, government-sponupon civil liberties, and
82
campaign.1
media
sored
A series of analyses have indicated that the British legislation
had a significant deterrent effect upon the combination of drinking and driving. During the week's prime drinking hours-Friday
evening to Sunday morning-there was a sharp drop in the
number of total injuries, fatalities, and serious injuries arising out
of motor vehicle accidents. This is especially relevant when compared to a control curve for the remaining hours of the week
which showed no change in fatalities or serious injuries. During
the test period there was no reduction in the amount of driving
done by Britons, nor was there a diminution in the amount of
alcohol consumed. The law was credited with deterring the population from combining the two activities. Perhaps the most persuasive documentation for the deterrent effect of the legislation
was that in the period before adoption of the legislation, twentyfive percent of drivers involved in fatal crashes had an illegal
while afterward only fifteen percent had
blood alcohol 18content,
3
illegal BAC's.
The deterrent effect of the British drunk driving law was shortlived. It began to dissipate within a few years of its adoption. The
number of fatal crashes began rising toward its previous level, as
did the number of serious injuries and fatal crashes occuring during prime drinking hours. Six years after adoption of the legislation, the percentage of drivers with illegal BAC's reached the pre1 84
Act level, and continued to climb.
The significant change in British drinking and driving practices and the subsequent reversion to old habits has been attributed to the public's perception of the likelihood of apprehension.
It has been suggested that initially the public feared that there was
a realistic chance of being caught and punished. However, the
real chance that a drunk driver would be caught, charged, and
convicted, though increased from one in every two million vehicle
miles driven to one in every one million vehicle miles driven, was
never very great. 185 The publicity surrounding the enforcement
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Id.
H.
Id.

at 26-28.
at 30-32; Sabey & Codling, supra note 178, at 74, 78.
Ross, supra note 162, at 32-34.
at 33.
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campaign as well as the dire predictions made by the law's opponents exaggerated the certainty of apprehension, and resulted in
compliance. Once the public perception of the risk became 186
more
realistic, the initial deterrent effect of the law was negated.
Subsequent studies explain why the British law was initially
successful in controlling drunk driving. In 1975, after British
drunk driving levels had returned to those existing prior to the
legislation, a local campaign known as the "Cheshire Blitz" reemphasized the effect of increased enforcement when coupled with
publicity. 87 The "Cheshire Blitz" expanded enforcement of the
Act in one locale to six times the national average. The "Blitz"
also reawakened the opposition to the Act and received substantial publicity. Although the small size of the sample prevents the
statistics from being conclusive, the Cheshire experience resulted
in a marked decline in the number of fatal and serious injury
crashes during prime drinking hours while the campaign was
88
under way.'
A French law adopted in 1978, patterned after the British Act
and enforcement campaign, produced similar results. 189 But a
New Zealand law, almost identical to the British Act but unaccompanied by a publicity campaign and lacking an active opposition was, at first, relatively ineffective. A later, well-publicized
enforcement campaign aimed at scaring young drivers into compliance had short term success in curbing drinking and driving.' 9 0
On the other hand, experiments in controlling drunk driving,
which have focused on increasing the severity of punishment
without increasing the certainty of apprehension and conviction,
have typically been unsuccessful, even in the short run, in deterring drinking and driving. 19 1 Of themselves, punitive measures
appear to have had little impact. However, more zealous enforcement of existing or new laws in communities and countries which
have advised the public of the enforcement campaign appear to
186. Id. at 34.
187. See id. at 71-75; Ross, Deterrence Regained- The Cheshire Constabulary's
"BreathalyzerBlitz," 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 241 (1977).
188. See H. Ross, supra note 162, at 71-75.
189. Ross, McCleary & Epperlein, Deterrence of Drinking and Driving in France: An
Evaluation ofthe Law of 7/12/78, 16 LAW & Soc'y REv. 345 (1982).
190. H. Ross, supra note 162, at 52-57.
191. See id. at 96-97 & 103-07; Roberston, Rich & Ross, Jail Sentencesfor Driving
While Intoxicated in Chicago: 4 Judicial Policy That Failed, 8 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 55
(1973). But see Hearings, supra note 9, at 19 (testimony of William Plymat, Director of
Council on Alcohol Problems).
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dissuade some who ordinarily drink and drive from combining
these activities. 192
2. Experiments in DeterringDrunk Driving in the United States
All fifty states have followed the Scandinavian lead and now
193
admit chemical tests as evidence in drunk driving prosecutions.
Penalties for refusing the chemical test in this country are less
harsh than in Britain, where equivalent penalties are possible for
refusal to submit to chemical testing and conviction of drunk driving. 194 Prosecution, then, is somewhat streamlined in the United
States; refusal to submit to a chemical test may result in a traditional prosecution, although many states permit the refusal to be
used as evidence in the prosecution's case. 195 By way of comparison, the British Road Safety Act allows police to require breath
tests of any driver involved in an accident or stopped for a moving
violation.' 96 This intrusion into privacy stimulated much of the
opposition which resulted in the publicity accorded the British Act
and initial enforcement campaign. 197 In the United States, neither
involvement in an accident or a moving violation, alone, would
provide probable cause to permit a law enforcement officer to require a driver to take a chemical test or face license suspension.
While the latitude in enforcement given British police would
be impermissible in the United States, experiments and studies of
American drunk driving laws typically involve changes in enforcement levels. Increased enforcement campaigns such as the
192. "A major difference between the Chicago crackdown and the Lackland [Air Force
Base] and British efforts is the greater emphasis on apprehension of the drinking driver in
the latter two cases. It is reasonable to hypothesize that countermeasures which increase
the probability of apprehension may deter a subset of drinkers from driving while impaired
but that strictly punitive countermeasures will have little, if any, effect." Robertson, Rich
& Ross, supra note 191, at 66.
193. NATIONAL OVERVIEW, supra note 2, at 43.
194. See H. Ross, supra note 162, at 27.
195. See, e.g., S. D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-13-28.1 (Supp. 1983):
Notwithstanding the provisions of§ 19-13-28, when a person stands trial for driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, . . and that person has refused
chemical analysis,. . . such refusal is admissible into evidence. Such person may
not claim privilege against self-incrimination with regard to admission of refusal
to submit to chemical analysis.
The constitutionality of§ 19-13-28.1 was upheld in South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916
(1983). Ohio courts have consistently held that refusal of a test is admissible. See State v.
Stanton, 12 Ohio App. 2d 99, 231 N.E.2d 322 (1967) (citing with approval State v. Nutt, 78
Ohio App. 336, 65 N.E.2d 675 (1946); State v. Gatton, 60 Ohio App. 192, 20 N.E.2d 265
(1938); City of Dayton v. Allen, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 179 (Montgomery Cty. C.P. Ct. 1959)).
196. H. Ross, supra note 162, at 26.
197. Id.
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Alcohol Safety Action Projects (ASAP's), funded under the National Highway Safety Act,198 have demonstrated a limited ability
to deter drunk driving. The ASAP's were local projects operating
under National Highway Traffic Safety Administration guidelines

but varied depending upon local community standards of law enforcement.1 99 Almost a third of the eighty-eight million dollars
spent under the program 2" went to fund specially trained police

patrols, instructed in techniques for spotting drunk drivers and assigned to key locations during the hours when drunk driving activity is greatest. 20 As a result of this increase in resources and
refinement in techniques, drunk driving arrests were two and onehalf to forty times greater than previous levels.20 2
Recognizing that additional arrests might clog the courts and
result in delays of prosecution which might adversely impact upon
the deterrent value of the projects, great emphasis was placed
upon diversion and treatment. Court procedures were streamlined: judges were encouraged to distinguish between offenders
who would benefit from treatment and those who should be fully
prosecuted and punished.20 3 Rather than lengthening penalties,
198. Pub. L. No. 89-564, 80 Stat. 731 (1966) (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C.
401-04 (1982)).
199. See NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, SUMMARY OF NATIONAL ALCOHOL SAFETY ACTION PROJECTS 16 (1979)

[hereinafter cited as ASAP REPORT]:
The Alcohol Safety Action Program was a series of local projects given consistency only by a single concept and by the National Highway and Traffic Safety
Administration guidelines. It was not a monolithic "national program" in the
sense of uniformity but a nationwide experimental and demonstration program
that stands or falls according to the real world dynamics of local community
systems.
200. Id. at 22. The $88 million figure refers to funds provided under 23 U.S.C. § 403
(1982). Funds were also provided under 23 U.S.C. § 402 (1982) and by local sources.
201. ASAP REPORT, supra note 199, at 14. The relationship of drinking and driving
behavior to time of day is well-documented:
[DIrinking-driving is primarily a nighttime phenomenon. Drinking drivers are
found two to four times as often in nighttime crashes as in daytime crashes ....
[W]ith respect to day of the week, alcohol related crashes and drinking drivers are
also more frequent on weekends than on weekdays, although the effect is not
nearly as great as it is for the day.
SUMMARY VOLUME, supra note 3, at 32.

202. H. Ross, supra note 162, at 87.
203. See ASAP REPORT, supra note 199, at 13-16. Judicial policy and attitudes in a
statutory ASAP system are examined in Note, VAS4P: A Rehabilitation Alternatipe to
TraditionalDW1 Penalties, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 673 (1978). VA. CODE § 18.2-27 1.1
(Cum. Supp. 1983) gives significant judicial discretion in determining whether an offender
will undergo ASAP rehabilitation or will suffer a traditional penalty. The author of the
Note suggests that the extent of this discretion may exceed equal protection bounds. The
Virginia Supreme Court found equal protection statisfied by interpreting the statute to re-
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the diversion program excused many offenders from criminal penalties.2° The ASAP's were credited with increasing the certainty
of apprehension and the speed of court processing leading to conviction or treatment." 5 One-third of the communities participating in the projects experienced significant reductions in fatal crash
rates during nighttime hours, the peak drinking period.20 6
3.

The Limits of Deterrence

Since the deterrent effect of drunk driving statutes appears
closely tied to public perception of the likelihood of arrest, the
impact of any law or enforcement campaign is highly transient.
The positive effect will be limited to the period immediately following enactment of the law or inception of the enforcement campaign. Ultimately, the public will gain an understanding that
even if the chances of arrest are increased to some degree, the likelihood of arrest will never be great. Moreover, there are limits to
any enforcement campaign in a free society. The potential costs
in terms of individual liberty must be balanced against the need
for strict enforcement of drunk driving laws.
Nonetheless, some campaigns have been successful in saving
lives. The key appears to lie not in increasing the severity of punishment but in increasing the certainty of detection and conviction.20 7 Publicity is a critical factor. For a harsher law or a
tougher enforcement policy to be effective, the public must know
about the law or policy. Unfortunately, the public's perception of
quire" 'good faith consideration' of a motion to assign the offender to an alcohol program
." Midkiff v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 1, 3, 286 S.E.2d 150, 151 (1982).
204. "No effort was made to increase penalties for drinking and driving. Rather, the
penalties were de facto reduced due to the provision for diversion of large numbers of
offenders from routine punishment to treatment." H. Ross, supra note 162, at 87.
205. Id.
206. ASAP REPORT, supra note 199, at 17-18. The overall quality of the data derived
from the ASAP's has been criticized on methodological grounds. See H. Ross. supra note
162, at 88-89; Zimring, Policy Experiments in General Deterrence,1970-75, in NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 161, at 149.

207. A number of studies have attempted to measure a drunk driver's chance of apprehension. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (chance of apprehension in Britain is
one for every million vehicle miles driven); Borkenstein, Problems of Enforcement, Adjudication and Sanctioning, in ALCOHOL, DURGS AND TRAFFIC SAFETY', supra note 178, at 660
(2000 violations, that is trips with BAC of .10% or more, for every arrest); Persson, Actual
Drunken Drivingin Sweden, in 6 SCANDINAVIAN STUDS. IN CRIMINOLOGY, supra note 174,
at 111-12 (at least 200 offenses per arrest in Sweeden); L. SUMMERS & D. HARRIS, THE
GENERAL DETERRENCE OF DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED (1978), reprintedin H. Ross,
supra note 162 at 106 (probability of an accident while driving under the influence .00045;
probability of arrest likewise miniscule, .00044).
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the likelihood of being punished for a violation cannot be accurate. Once the public knows how unlikely apprehension and conviction are, the law will have minimal deterrent effect, and prior
behavior patterns are likely to reemerge. This limitation upon deterrence appears insurmountable, since it would hardly be acceptable for state and local governments to mount disinformation
campaigns aimed at scaring their citizens into compliance.
Moreover, a successful enforcement campaign is likely to increase the number of court cases dramatically, thereby impacting
upon the speed of conviction, an indispensable element of deterrence. Mandatory jail time and the prospect of a DWI offense on a
defendant's record, especially where increased penalties are required for subsequent offenses, are strong incentives for defendants to fight a DWI charge if they are able.20 Delaying tactics
and an increase in the number of trials requested may exhaust the
justice system's time and money. Consequently, there may be additional delays for all cases on the docket and a marked decrease
in the likelihood of trying all defendants who demand their constitutionally guaranteed right to a trial within the time limits set
by speedy trial requirements. 9
Finally, deterrence may be limited because a substantial percentage of drunk drivers may be alcoholics or problem drinkers. 2 10 Even in Scandinavia, which has the longest tradition of
severe treatment for drunk drivers and arguably marshals the
greatest moral indignation toward the problem, the percentage of
fatally injured drivers with high blood alcohol contents remains at
an alarming level.2 1' European laws generally have not focused
upon problem drinkers, opting instead to treat all offenders
alike.21 2 This European approach to deterrence makes some
sense. It is based on the assumption that even if many crash fatalities are caused by alcoholics or problem drinkers, it does not necessarily follow that these individuals have lost control over their
208. By diverting many offenders to treatment programs, the ASAP's largely removed
this incentive to delay. See supra note 204.
209. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.71 (Page 1982) (Ohio speedy trial law).
210. See SUMMARY VOLUME, supra note 3, at 21, for dfinitions of these categories and
estimates of the percentages of each that make up of the drunk driving population. A
Quincy, Mass. study estimates the percentage of drunk drivers at 75% or higher. See
Kramer, The Drunk Driver: Where Is He Heading?, 22 JUDGES' JOURNAL 8, 10 (1983).
211. See H. Ross, supra note 162, at 65-66.
212. Foreign programs employing the legal approach have generally made no deliberate attempt to deal differently with various categories of drinking drivers, even in recent
years. SUMMARY VOLUME, supra note 3, at 36.
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entire lives, in particular the decision to get into a car and drive.
Nonetheless, the absence of any effort to treat or cure the alcoholism problems of arrested drivers who are unable to control their
drinking may place too much faith in the deterrence theory. It
loses sight of the purpose of the DWI laws-prevention of fatal
crashes. Such an approach may condemn to death those citizens
unfortunate enough to encounter the alcoholic offender once he
has served his mandatory time in jail and is again drunk on the
road.
In sum, the general deterrent effect of S.B. 432 is likely to be
slight. The certainty of punishment under the new law will not
increase appreciably, since no effort to increase enforcement has
been made. While there has been some streamlining of procedures in processing DWI offenders, potentially decreasing the
time from arrest to punishment, the threat of a mandatory jail sentence, where the state provision is enforced, may motivate offenders to ask for trials and thereby create the delay that thwarts
deterrence. Severity has been increased on the state level, especially for repeat offenders. However, alleged home rule constraints
inhibit statewide uniformity of this severity. Furthermore, severity of penalties alone, the studies show, will not deter drinking and
driving. Without a foundation of certainty, speed, and severity,
the publicity proclaiming a tougher approach to drunk driving in
Ohio will be ignored.2" 3 Thus, even the limited deterrence that
can result from a well-conceived campaign against drunk driving
like that in Great Britain or the ASAP's, appears likely to elude
Ohio under existing conditions. The ultimate goal of the formation of a habit of obedience will likewise be unattainable.
B.

Special Deterrence: The Effect of the Law Upon the
Apprehended Offender

Perhaps recognizing the impediments to the general deterrent
effect of S.B. 432, proponents of the new Ohio law indicated that
their primary goal was to influence the future behavior of those
213. The Ohio Department of Highway Safety (DHS) has conceived some interesting
ideas to publicize the new law. One is a wallet-sized chart that estimates one's BAC as a
function of number of drinks and body weight. On the other side of this card is a brief
summary of "Ohio's Tough New 'Drunk Driving' Laws." Another notion is "REDDI," an
acronym for "Report Every Dangerous Driver Immediately," that encourages citizens to
report any dangerous driving that they observe. Such a program could aid enforcement of
the new law by directly assisting police in locating drunk drivers and by deterring drinkers
who are afraid that zealous fellow motorists or neighbors might call police. Without enforcement of tougher penalties, however, these efforts are wasted.
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individuals who are arrested and charged with violation of the
statute.21 4 Critical to this goal is the immediate impact of the law
upon the individual. The purpose of physically depriving the arrestee of his driver's license at the scene of the arrest is to shock
the driver and alert him to the serious consequences which follow
commission of the act. Subsequently, the offender will become
aware of the prosecutor's leverage-if the offender has taken a
chemical test, then he may be guilty almost automatically of a per
se offense; if the offender has refused a test, that fact may be used
at trial. Moreover, once convicted, the offender must spend at
least three days in jail, regardless of a judge's inclination.
In theory, the statutory scheme appears likely to jolt prior offenders into future compliance with the law's demands, but reality
discloses substantial obstacles to achievement of this limited goal.
First, there will be no initial shock if the automatic license suspension provision is held unconstitutional. Second, since the primary
shock to the offender intended under the statute is the mandatory
three-day jail sentence, apprehension and conviction in a jurisdiction still operating under a municipal ordinance that does not contain the same provision and where suspended sentences are
routine will only reinforce preexisting attitudes that drunk driving
is not a serious offense. Further, license suspension is an ineffective sanction. Judges are even more reluctant to jail offenders who
drive with suspended licenses than they are to jail drunk drivers.
A recent California study showed that sixty-five percent of those
215
who had their licenses taken away continued to drive.
A final problem which will obstruct achievement of the special
deterrence goal as well as the general deterrence objective is the
alcoholic offender. Regardless of the number of times that an alcoholic or problem drinker is convicted, lack of control over his
drinking behavior may result in more offenses. S.B. 432 does not
require treatment of alcoholics and problem drinkers, although
presumably a judge may order such treatment after the
mandatory jail sentence has been served. Without sophisticated
and effective diagnostic programs, however, a judge may not be
aware of the offender's condition. The message of S.B. 432 is punishment, not treatment. The House of Representatives deleted the
treatment alternative for first offenders proposed by the Senate in
214. Interview with George Jupinko, Chief Counsel, Ohio Department of Highway
Safety (June 21, 1983).
215. See LICENSE SUSPENSION STUDY, supra note 40.
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the original version of the bill.2 16 Neither chamber championed
mandatory treatment. Therefore, like general deterrence and habit
formation, the special deterrence goal may elude Ohio.
C. An EmpiricalLook at SB. 432
Empirical evidence supports the prediction that the deterrent
effect of S.B. 432 will be insignificant. Notwithstanding the statute's procedural changes and tougher penalties, DWI offenders
are not being treated much differently than they were prior to enactment of the law. It may be too early to dismiss the law as a
total failure, but statewide statistics on fatal crashes since the effective date of the new law reflect no improvement over previous
years. To evaluate the procedural impact of S.B. 432, the DWI
dockets of the City of Cleveland and the City of Cleveland
Heights were examined. The hundred days following the effective
date of S.B. 432, March 16, 1983 until June 24, 1983, were compared with the same hundred-day period in 1982.
The DWI law of the City of Cleveland was not changed to
mirror the revisions in the state statute. Cleveland prosecutes arrestees for one of three different offenses: the state DWI statute
(which itself contains four separate offenses), the Cleveland municipal DWI ordinance,2" 7 which is much like the state statute
prior to the S.B. 432 revisions, or a lesser included offense to the
municipal DWI ordinance, entitled "actual physical control."21
None of the ordinances mandates a three-day jail sentence. Actual physical control is less serious than municipal DWI in two
respects: it carries no points towards license suspension, 21 9 nor
does it qualify as a first DWI offense if the offender is convicted
again for DWI, and thus does not trigger the enhanced penalties
mandated by the state statute if a subsequent prosecution is
brought under the state statute.
The total number of defendants charged with one of the three
offenses increased about eight percent between the two hundredday periods in 1982 and 1983, from 583 to 627.220 Of those
216. Compare Am. Sub. S.B. 432, 114th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. § 451199(A)(1)
(Apr. 29, 1982) (as passed by the Senate) with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.99(A)(1)
(Page Supp. 1982) (identical to House version).
217. CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE § 433.01(a) (1976).
218. CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE § 433.01(b) (1976).
219. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4507.40(G) (Page Supp. 1982).
220. The significance of this increase in charges is unclear, it could mean either increased enforcement of the DWI laws or more drunk driving activity.
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charged, ninety-four percent were convicted in 1982, and ninteyseven percent were convicted in 1983.22 The high conviction rates
may be attributed to the fact that almost all defendants pleaded
guilty to one of the three charges. There were no DWI trials
whatsoever during the two periods. Many defendants were permitted to plead to the actual physical control offense: sixty-eight
percent in 1982 and fifty-four percent in 1983.222 Almost all remaining defendants were permitted to plead to the municipal
DWI ordinance, carrying no mandatory jail sentence: twentyfour percent in 1982 and thirty-eight percent in 1983.223 Only
eight percent of all Cleveland DWI offenders charged in the periods each year pleaded and were convicted under the state
statute.224
The increased percentage of pleas and convictions under the
municipal DWI ordinance rather than its lesser included offense is
possibly attributable to the increased prosecutorial leverage contained within the threat of prosecuting under the state statute.
The most valuable plea bargaining card held by an offender is the
threat of a trial, which the system cannot afford. Yet if the outcome of a trial is almost certain to be a finding of guilt, and the
penalty for a conviction at trial is far more severe than that available through plea bargaining, the prosecutor holds the stronger
hand. The per se offenses simplify the proof required at trial, so
that if the defendant has taken a chemical test, he stands less
chance of beating the DWI charge than he did prior to the 1983
amendments. Thus, Cleveland prosecutors may be able to induce
defendants to plead to the more serious municipal DWI charge
rather than actual physical control by using the threat of a per se
221.
Defendants Charged
Defendants Convicted

1982

1983

583
550

627
608

1982

1983

373
550

327
608

1982

1983

130
550

230
608

1982

1983

47
550

51
608

222.
Convictions Under § 433.01(b)
AR Convictions
223.
Convictions Under § 433.01(a)
AU Convictions
224.
Convictions Under § 4511.19
Al Convictions
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prosecution and mandatory jail time. For some Cleveland offenders, then, the existence of the state statute may result in DWI convictions, even though not under the harsher state statute.
A key aspect of S.B. 432 is the enhanced jail sentences, fines,
and license suspensions for drunk driving. The Cleveland data
reveal only minor changes in these categories. In the hundred-day
period in 1982, eighty-three offenders, or fifteen percent of the total convicted for all three offenses, spent time in jail. In 1983, only
105 offenders, or seventeen percent, spent time in jail. Strangely,
even those offenders convicted under the state statute were not
necessarily imprisoned. In 1983, only thirty-four of the fifty-one
offenders convicted under the state statute in the hundred-day period were jailed. Thus, Cleveland still imprisons few DWI
offenders.
Most DWI offenders in Cleveland received fines: ninety-four
percent in both 1982 and 1983.225 Fines were slightly higher in
1983: seventy-seven percent of all offenders were assessed the state
minimum of $150 or more, while seventy-one percent paid
$150 or
more in 1982.226 License suspensions are not commonly ordered
by Cleveland judges: thirty percent of offenders had their licenses
taken away in 1982, and even fewer, twenty-eight percent, lost
their licenses for any time in 1983.227 However, license suspensions were more likely to be severe in 1983: twelve percent of offenders lost their licenses for the state minimum of sixty days or
more in 1983, compared with only seven percent in 1982.228 Assignment to rehabilitation programs was down from thirty-one
225.
Offenders Receiving Fines
All Convicted Offenders

1982

1983

517
550

573
608

1982

1983

388
550

467
608

1982

1983

167
550

173
608

1982

1983

41
550

74
608

226.
Fines of $150 or more
All Convicted Offenders
227.
License Suspensions
Total Convictions
228.
License Suspensions of 60 Days or More
Total Convictions
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percent in 1982 to eight percent in 1983.229
The speed of punishment for drunk driving seems to have increased following enactment of S.B. 432. In 1982, only forty percent of DWI cases were disposed of within ninety days, while in
1983, sixty-five percent were disposed of within ninety days. 230 It
is not possible to determine whether the speedier dispositions are
a consequence of increased prosecutorial leverage, or stem from
factors unrelated to S.B. 432.
On its own initiative, the City of Cleveland has made some
attempts to increase DWI enforcement. It has assigned a few officers to high-accident areas at times when drunk driving is most
frequent.23 ' While such increased enforcement is necessary to
achieve the deterrence objective, Cleveland lacks the resources to
enforce the new law fully. Even if enforcement could be more
tenacious, Cleveland does not have the jail space for even those
offenders who are currently in the system.2 32 Given these constraints, it is not surprising that the Cleveland statistics reveal no
substantial change as a result of S.B. 432.
Unlike Cleveland, the City of Cleveland Heights changed its
DWI ordinance as a consequence of S.B. 432. Cleveland Heights
adopted the per se offenses but ignored the mandatory sentence
provisions of the state statute. It charges all arrestees under its
own municipal ordinance. If breath test results are available, the
arrestee is typically charged under both the subjective impaired
driving section and a per se offense. In some cases, the charge
may be reduced to reckless operation, which is similar to Cleveland's actual physical control offense in that it does not constitute
a first DWI offense and yields fewer Bureau of Motor Vehicles
points.2 33
In the hundred days following the March 16, 1983 effective
229.
Rehabiliation Programs Used
Total Convictions

1982

1983

170
550

47
608

1982

1983

230.
Convictions under § 433.01(a)
221
397
All Convictions
550
608
231. Interview with Fred Bolden, Cleveland Police Department (Feb. 28, 1984).
232. Interview with Ronald Adrine, Cleveland Municipal Court Judge (Feb. 17, 1984).
According to Judge Adrine, there are only about 230 jail spaces available to Cleveland's
municipal judges.
233.

CLEVELAND HTs., OHIO, MUN. ORD. § 333.01 (1983).
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date of S.B. 432, eighty-nine percent of Cleveland Heights arrestees charged with DWI were convicted under the municipal
DWI ordinance, while the remaining eleven percent were convicted of reckless operation. In the comparable period in 1982,
seventy-four percent were convicted of DWI, while twenty percent
were convicted of reckless operation. 234 The decline in the total
number of arrested and charged offenders between 1982 and 1983,
from thirty-four to nineteen, may indicate some reduction in the
frequency of drunk driving as a result of S.B. 432, although
changes in enforcement activity or police attitudes could be responsible for the drop. The greater percentages of arrestees convicted of either offense and of offenders convicted of DWI rather
than reckless operation may be, as in Cleveland, the consequence
of greater prosecutorial leverage stemming from the per se offenses. All of the 1983 defendants in this period pleaded guilty to
either DWI or reckless operation, while four of the 1982 defendants pleaded not guilty and were tried. Thus, the per se offenses
may have strengthened the prosecutor's hand in Cleveland
Heights.
A convicted DWI offender in Cleveland Heights, as in Cleveland, is unlikely to spend any time in jail. In the hundred-day
period in 1982, only sixteen percent of convicted offenders were
imprisoned. This figure rose to thirty-five percent in 1983, indicating that S.B. 432 may have influenced the Cleveland Heights court
to award harsher penalties despite the absence of a mandatory
sentence in the ordinance.23 5 Most Cleveland Heights DWI offenders are fined: in the hundred days after the effective date of
S.B. 432, eighty-two percent of offenders convicted under the municipal DWI ordinance were fined $150 or more ($150 is the state
minimum for first offenders), while seventy-six percent were fined
234.
1982

1983

Total Convictions
34
19
Municipal DWI
25
17
Reckless Operation
7
2
One 1982 arrestee was found not guilty at trial, and one failed to appear.
235.
1982
1983
Offenders Receiving Imprisonment
Total DWI Convictions

4
25

6
17
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$150 or more in the comparable period in 1982.236 Cleveland
Heights, like Cleveland, is unlikely to suspend an offender's
driver's license. In 1983, sixty-five percent of convicted offenders
received no license suspension at all, and only twenty-four percent

received the state minimum for first offenses of sixty days or more.
In 1982, twenty-eight percent of convicted offenders had their
licenses suspended for sixty days or more.2 37 Assignment to rehabilitation programs was down from thirty-six percent in 1982 to
eighteen percent in 1983.238 Thus, the severity of punishment for
DWI offenders since S.B. 432 seems to have increased somewhat,
except in the realm of license suspension. Perhaps license suspension has fallen into disfavor among judges due to its perceived
ineffectiveness in keeping offenders off the road.2 3 9

Municipalities throughout Ohio have responded in different
ways to S.B. 432.240 A survey of municipal and county court
judges reveals that many municipalities have chosen to treat
drunk driving as Cleveland or Cleveland Heights do.24 1 Of 121
judges responding to the survey,24 2 sixty-eight percent reported
236.
Offenders Receiving Fines of $150 or More
Total DWI Convictions

1982

1983

19
25

14
17

1982

1983

14
7
25

6
4
17

1982

1983

237.
Any License Suspension
Suspension of 60 Days or More
Total DWI Convictions
238.
9
3
Rehabilitation
25
17
Total DWI Convictions
239. See supra note 40. The speed of prosection in the 100-day period following the
effective date of S.B. 432 appears little different from the comparable period in 1982. Sixtyeight percent of cases were disposed of within ninety days in 1983, while 66% were disposed
of within ninety days in 1982. Speculation has arisen that the tougher penalties likely to be
awarded since S.B. 432 took effect might stimulate delay and longer periods until disposition, since more offenders, it is hypothesized, will fight the charges. However, both Cleveland and Cleveland Heights statistics prove this speculation false: despite generally
harsher penalties, cases are being disposed of with speed at least equal to that prior to S.B.
432.
1982
1983
13
Disposition in 90 Days or Fewer
21
Total Convictions
32
19
240. See supra note 82.
241. Judges' Survey, supra note 25.
242. There were 258 municipal and county court judges in Ohio on Dec. 31, 1982. See
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that their jurisdictions had revised or were in the process of revising their DWI ordinances.2 4 3 Almost all of those reporting
changes reported the addition of per se provisions and enhanced
penalties for repeat ofenders, 24 and about two-thirds reported the
enactment of mandatory jail sentences for first offenders.24 5 Including those jurisdictions which did not change their ordinances,
it appears that less than half of Ohio's municipalities statutorily
require that a convicted offender spend time in jail. It is unclear
whether these legal changes have generally increased
prosecutorial leverage and caused defendants to plead guilty or no
contest to DWI charges-fifty-five percent of the judges reported
a higher percentage of guilty or no contest pleas since the effective
date of S.B. 432.246 The estimated average increase in guilty and
no contest pleas was thirty-one percent.2 47
The mandatory jail sentences that are essential to the state
scheme are thwarted by many of Ohio's municipal and county
judges. Only fifty-nine percent reported sentencing first offenders
to three-day jail terms.24 8 Many reported using intervention programs as a subsitute for incarceration.2 4 9 Only a slight majority,
fifty-two percent, observed any increase in the speed of prosecution of DWI cases since S.B. 432.250 Enforcement levels appeared
largely unchanged: thirty-eight percent of the judges reported
more DWI filings since the effective date of S.B. 432, thirty percent reported fewer filings, and thirty-two percent reported no
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, OHIO COURTS SUMMARY 1982, at 71, 125 (23d summary ed.
1983)

243. Eighty-four reported amendments completed or pending, while 37 did not.
Judges' Survey, supra note 25.
244. Seventy-two judges reported adoption of "specified B.A.C. provisions." Id.
245. Fifty-one reported amendments to require mandatory jail sentences for first offenders while 20 did not. Statewide examples of these ordinances run the gamut of options
reported by the judges. The City of Cleveland, for instance, has not changed its ordinance.
Both Cleveland Heights and Chagrin Falls have adopted the per se offenses but not
mandatory jail time. See supra note 82.
246. Sixty-six judges reported an increase in guilty or no contest pleas, while 55 did not.
Judges' Survey, supra note 25.
247. This figure is based on an average of 51 estimates reported. Id.
248. Seventy-three judges reported using three-day sentences for first offenders, while
50 did not. Id.
249. Seventy reported using alcohol intervention programs, while 11 did not. The fact
that more judges reported using both three-day jail sentence and intervention programs
than answered the survey (123) may be simply understood by realizing that some judges
may do either, depending on the case. The survey question discussed in note 247, supra,
did not ask, "do you sentence all first offenders to minimum three-day jail terms." Id.
250. Sixty judges observed faster disposition, while 55 did not. Id.
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change.2 5 ' Thus, the judicial survey largely corroborates the results from Cleveland and Cleveland Heights: S.B. 432 has had
only a slight impact on the enforcement, prosecution and adjudication of DWI cases.
In light of these minimal improvements in the processing of
DWI cases, it is not surprising that there has been no reduction in
fatal crashes statewide since the effective date of S.B. 432. In fact,
there were six more alcohol-related deaths between March 16,
1983 and January 1, 1984 than between March 16, 1982 and January 1, 1983.252 Moreover, forty-three percent of Ohio traffic deaths
in 1983 were determined to be alcohol-related, as opposed to
thirty-eight percent in 1982.253 Although arrests for drunk driving
declined thirteen percent in 1983 from the 1982 level,25 4 this statistic is ambiguous, since it may reflect changes in enforcement policy and activity rather than the frequency of drunk driving
behavior. In any event, arrest statistics are of secondary importance. The most important goal of S.B. 432 is the prevention of
fatal crashes through deterrence of drinking and driving. The
Ohio approach to drunk driving remains poorly suited to this task.
CONCLUSION:

A ROADMAP

The general and special deterrent purposes of DWI legislation
are intended ultimately to stimulate a public attitude of moral opposition to drunk driving. However, there are innate limitations
in the general and special deterrent effectiveness of DWI legislation. Achievement of the ultimate goal, formation of the moral
component and habit of obedience to the law's requirements, 55 is
impossible without a wholehearted commitment to wresting every
possible measure of deterrence from the existing legislation. As251. Forty-two judges reported an increase in filings, 32 reported a decrease, and 36
reported no change. Id.
252. Box Score, supra note 8. There were a total of 515 alcohol-related deaths in this
period in 1982, and 521 in the same period in 1983.
253. In 1982, 589/1541 traffic deaths were determined to be alcohol-related, while in
1983, 647/1520 traffic deaths were determined to be alcohol-related. Id.
254. From 48,939 to 42,658. Id.
255. The awareness of hazards of imprisonment or intoxicated driving is in a
country like Sweden a living reality to every driver, and for most people the risk
seems too great. When a man goes to a party where alcoholic drinks are likely to
be served, and if he is not fortunate enough to have a wife who drives but does
not drink, he will leave his car at home or he will limit his consumption to a
minimum. It is also my feeling-although I am here on uncertain ground-that
the legislation has been instrumentalinforming the widespread conviction that it is
wrong, or irresponsible,to place oneself behind the wheel when intoxicated...
J. ANDENAES, supra note 157, at 60-61 & n.39 (emphasis added).
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suming the state government's firm commitment, additional steps
must be taken to control drunk driving more effectively.
The numerous errors and ambiguities in the statutes must be
resolved by the General Assembly. Section 3720.06 must be
amended to allow treatment programs to be used only after the
mandatory minimum jail sentences have been served, so that
treatment is not used by judges as an alternative to incarceration
for first offenders.2 5 6 To forestall any due process challenges, the
General Assembly should permit the section 4511.191(F) issues to
be raised at the initial judicial suspension hearing.
More importantly, S.B. 432 must be applied uniformly
throughout the state. Municipal courts imposing sanctions under
local ordinances and failing to impose any jail sentence or suspending the first three days of a sentence are nullifying the state
statute. An action for a writ of prohibition brought by the attorney general against a municipal court which fails to apply the
state sanction would resolve the question of whether municipal
nulification is a proper exercise of authority under the home rule
amendment. If the drunk driving statute fails to meet the test of
statewide concern or if the ordinances are held not to conflict with
the statute, proponents of mandatory jail sentences for drunk drivers would be alerted to the need to seek an amendment to article
XVIII, section 3 of the Ohio Constitution.
Convicted drunk drivers who continue to drive after their
licenses have been suspended or revoked must be treated more
seriously than in the past. These offenders have demonstrated that
neither the general nor specific deterrent purposes of the law will
dissuade them from committing violations. Offenders who have
been convicted of drunk driving and reapprehended for driving
during the license suspension period have demostrated an absolute lack of willingness to conform to the law's expectations. They
are equally likely to be on the road in an impaired condition as
they were without a license, and consequently signify a continuing
threat to the safety of all other drivers and pedestrians. The
mandatory surrender of license plates during suspension periods
should be required if the offender is the holder of plates, and consideration should be given to requiring the surrender of license
plates if a vehicle owner permits an unlicensed driver to operate
256. Likewise, § 4511.19 1(J)(2) should be amended to indicate that the "treatment and
intervention special account" is meant to pay for programs after minimum jail terms. The
per se offense based on a urine test should be eliminated from § 4511.19. The points provision should be amended to require that six points be assessed for any § 4511.19 violation.
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his vehicle. Serious thought must also be given to preventing
drivers whose licenses have been suspended from acquiring new
licenses in adjacent states. A solution to this problem is to require
all states to participate in a national clearinghouse providing icense information. States would then have access to information
sufficient to determine whether an applicant's license has been
suspended anywhere in the country. 57 If license suspension is to
impact significantly on individual behavior and add a deterrent
effect to DWI laws, an inescapable revocation of driving privileges
must occur.
The sanctions imposed under the Ohio statute are wholly punitive. Criminal penalties will have their greatest impact upon social drinkers who may very occasionally stray over the legal limit
and drive in an impaired condition. This class of potential violators may well be deterred by the threat of imprisonment that is
uniformly meted out following apprehension and conviction, and
may adjust their behavior to avoid drinking and driving. If, at
first, such an offender does not learn to obey the law, the increased
penalties attached to subsequent convictions should provide the
necessary reinforcement to ensure that the lesson is learned.
There is, however, a core group of nondeterrable drunk drivers, problem drinkers and alcoholics, who are responsible for a
significant share of America's drunk driving problem. It has been
suggested that as the class of individuals who do not fit into the
problem drinking category are deterred by the existence of the
law, the class of lawbreakers will become less a random sample of
drivers. Instead, violators will be those who are problem drinkers,
probably with a long history of drunk driving records, and less
amenable to being deterred. 2 8 These individuals may represent a
far greater proportion of the drunk driving problem than previ257. In 1982, Congress enacted a law providing for alcohol traffic safety programs and
a national driver register. 23 U.S.C. § 408 (1982) (alcohol traffic safety programs); National Driver Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 97-364, §§ 201-11, 96 Stat. 1738, 1740-48
(1982). The national driver register provides for the sort of exchange of information that
could make a driver with a suspended license unable to get a license in another state.
However, participation in the program is entirely voluntary on the part of each state. See
Pub. L. No. 97-364, § 204(a), (b). If Congress were willing to make federal highway grants
depend on participation in this program, unanimous participation might be assured. Without unanimous participation, the effectiveness of the law is greatly diminished, since a
driver with a suspended license could simply go to a nonparticipating state for a license.
258. "This fact must be taken into account in forecasting the effect of any increase in
the level of enforcement or punishment of an offense which is already strictly enforced and
punished. He who invests in increased severity, has to expect diminishing returns." J.
ANDENAES, supra note 157, at 104.
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ously perceived. The ASAP program concluded that most drunk
driving first offenders are social drinkers whose overindulgence is
aberrational and subject to correction through education.2 59
However, a survey in one court found the percentage of problem
drinkers and alcoholics to be much higher. The Quincy, Massachusetts District Court ordered all defendants charged with drunk
driving to undergo a two-day alcohol evaluation. That study concluded that more than seventy-five percent of first offenders were
alcoholics and only twenty-five percent were social drinkers. Alcoholic offenders are not likely to be deterred solely by the threat
of punishment.2 6 °
Likewise, alcoholic offenders are unlikely to alter behavior
patterns without effective treatment of their problem. Ohio
should establish a comprehensive diagnostic evaluation system
prior to sentencing for all offenders, patterned after existing models, to determine the extent of the offender's alcohol problem. Sentencing would then be based upon this diagnosis. If the offender is
free of alcohol or chemical dependency, sentencing consistent
with the present statutory requirement is adequate and likely to
affect the offender's future behavior. Those offenders who are
found to be dependent on alcohol or drugs should be incarcerated
for the minimum term with the remainder suspended, provided
the defendant successfully completes an approved treatment program. The nature of the treatment should vary from involvement
in counselling groups to the use of the drug antabuse 26 t for the
individual whose dependency is severe. Many individuals suffering from alcohol or drug dependency will deny their problems or
lapse into old habits unless supervised and coerced, thus followup
through the probation system is essential to ensure longterm success of treatment. The ultimate coercion is the threat of a return
to jail and completion of the suspended jail sentence.
Perhaps the greatest weakness in Ohio's scheme for controlling
drunk driving is its failure to provide for enhanced enforcement.
European and American pioneer efforts to reduce drunk driving
have demonstrated that general deterrence depends upon convinc259. The ASAP's found that one-third of drinking drivers are social drinkers, one-third
are problem drinkers, and the remaining third are somewhere in between. Drinkers fall
along a continuum, rather than fitting into neat compartments. See ASAP REPORT, supra
note 199, at 12-13.
260. See Kramer, supra note 210, at 10.
261. Antabuse (disulfiram) reacts violently with ingested alcohol, causing vomiting and
other serious physical discomfort. PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 616 (J. Angel 37th ed.
1983).
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ing would-be offenders that they are likely to be apprehended if
they violate the prohibition. Law enforcement efforts must be mobilized to enhance detection of drunk drivers by assignment of
additional personnel during peak drunk driving hours to locations
where the activity is greatest. The information upon which the
personnel assignments should be made is already available based
upon past records including prior arrests, accident reports, and
scenes of fatal crashes.
While the fourth amendment precludes American police officers from utilizing all of the tools employed by British police
during the peak period of enforcement of the British Road Safety
Act of 1967,262 ample police tools to enable more vigorous enforcement of drunk driving and other traffic safety laws have
passed constitutional muster. Although police may not arbitrarily
and without particularized cause stop individual motorists to determine whether they are drunk, the Supreme Court has upheld
checkpoint stops involving all motorists or those truly selected at
random for purposes of checking drivers' licenses, automobile registrations and vehicle safety.2 63
The Court has utilized a balancing test to determine the validity of this type of stop, weighing the interest of the state against
the nature and extent of the intrusion upon a motorist's privacy.
Accordingly, the state's interest in ensuring the safety of its highways was held to outweigh the motorist's interest in being free
from intrusions. Moreover, the intrusion was characterized by the
Court as minimal. It is likely that the same interest in safety
would be sufficient to justify roadblock stops to make a minimal
inquiry into the sobriety of motorists. The Kansas Supreme Court
has found constitutional a police drunk driving checkpoint where
all drivers were subjected to a license check and officers were allowed to determine if they could smell the odor of alcohol emanating from the vehicle or the motorist's breath. 26 That court
262. The commission of a traffic offense or mere involvement in a traffic accident does
not provide probable cause to believe that a motorist has been driving under the influence
of alcohol. When a police officer is called to the scene of an accident or has stopped a
motorist for a traffic offense and ordered the motorist from his automobile pursuant to
authority recognized in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), the motorist's conduct or speech may provide sufficient cause to believe that he was operating the vehicle
under the influence of alcohol or drugs. To require a chemical test, there must first be
probable cause to arrest the motorist for DWI. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966).
263. Delaware v. Prouse 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v. Prichard, 645 F.2d 854
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1981).
264. State v. Deskins, 673 P.2d 1174 (Kan. 1983). Butsee Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 663

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:239

said:
When we consider the enormity of the injury and damage
caused by the drinking driver and the vital interst of every citizen in being protected as far as possible upon the streets and
roadways, we find that the public interest in a properly conducted DWI roadblock containing appropriate safeguards outweighs the individual's right to be free from
unfettered
265
intrusion upon his Fourth Amendment rights.
Nothing inhibits the effect of any law more than delay in the
period between arrest and disposition. Prompt prosecution and
punishment adds to the perception that the community and its
criminal justice system view the matter seriously. Conversely, tolerance for delay, as the prosecution and defense wear each other
down to the point of accepting a compromise resolution without
trial, transmits the message that the matter is not of great importance. Unfortunately, courts beleaguered by overcrowded dockets
tend to accept this dilatory behavior from both sides in the interest
of reducing the number of trials.
The Ohio statute works both sides of the delay issue. The
change in the definition of the crime, making it a per se offense to
register a blood alcohol content of .10% or more, simplifies the
necessary proof in the event a case goes to trial. It substitutes a
scientifically valid and readily understandable term for the vague
concept of intoxication, making proof of the offense simply dependent on the chemical test rather than upon descriptions of the accused's behavior. Therefore, the amended law should promote
speedier dispositions because defendants confronted with proof of
the per se offense might well choose to plead to the charge and
relinquish a trial.26 6
On the other hand, a policy of strict enforcement, coupled with
the recognition by defendants that guilty verdicts, whether resulting from pleas or trials, will result in imposition of the mandatory
P.2d 992 (Ariz. 1983) (no guidelines and too much discretion vested in police officers);
Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 449 N.E. 2d 349 (Mass. 1983) (too much discretion
given to police, and roadblock unsafe); State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W. 2d (S.D. 1976) (violative
of fourth amendment because of lack of notice to motorists); Koonce v. State, 651 S.W. 2d
46 (Tex Ct. App. 1983) (no evidence of objective, nondiscretionary procedure).
It is important to note that courts invalidating roadblocks have done so because of the
manner and conditions of the roadblock, not because roadblocks are per se invalid.
265. 673 P.2d at 1185.
266. Though the judges' survey indicates that more defendants are pleading guilty
or no contest to DWI charges, only about half reported that the speed of disposition of DWI cases increased overall. See supra notes 221-40 and accompanying
text.
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jail sentence, may stiffen the reluctance of some to waive trials and
plead guilty. Moreover, this result may be compounded in the
case of repeat offenders who face enhanced mandatory sentences
for subsequent offenses. If the deterrent effect of the new law is to
be maximized, however, the courts will have to play a significant
role to ensure that the judicial phase of the state's assault on
drunk driving is not obstructionist. Courts facing extended calendars because of trial demands by defendants charged with drunk
driving must consider the creation of an alternate, expedited trial
calendar for drunk driving cases which should be given preference
over other misdemeanors. Alternatively, multijudge urban municipal courts should consider assigning all drunk driving prosecutions to one judge whose primary responsibility would be that
particular docket.
Finally, the deterrent effect of any law is limited, and achievement of even limited goals will involve continuous efforts and investment of significant resources. The proposals made here for
vigorous enforcement, expanded evaluations of convicted defendants to determing the existence of alcohol or chemical dependency, comprehensive treatment programs, and followup
supervision by expanded probation departments involve a substantial commitment of the state's resources. Past experience with
similar statutory changes has demonstrated the unlikelihood that
tougher penalties alone will have a significant deterrent effect.
Equally important to the development of a comprehensive program is that vigorous enforcement be sustained. The deterrent effect will be transient, at best, if enhanced enforcement occurs for a
few months and then is dropped. Old behavior patterns can be
counted upon to reappear as soon as the public, and especially
would-be offenders, perceive that the state has lost its zeal in dissuading this type of illegal behavior.
To date, there is no evidence that Ohio or its individual communites have mounted the sustained, well-publicized campaign
necessary to cause the public to reconsider decisions to combine
the potentially lethal behavior of drinking and driving. Ohio's
drunk driving law, as part of a comprehensive effort on the part of
all state and local agencies, can partially achieve the goal sought
by the legislature. Partial success which would lead to a saving of
some lives should provide sufficient incentive to make this effort.
Moreover, enforcement over an extended period of time can lead
towards the development of an attitude within the community that
the combination of drinking and driving is absolutely unaccept-
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able behavior, and thus stimulate a habit of compliance with the
law's command. Whether Ohio is able to exhibit the will necessary to mount the effort to achieve the limited success that comprehensive enforcement of the drunk driving law promises is not
at all clear. Nothing dampens will more than the prospect of less
than total success. In this instance, however, it is a matter of life
and death.

